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Editorial

Journal of Social and Development Sciences (JSDS) is a scholarly journal that deals with the disciplines of social and development sciences. JSDS publishes research work that meaningfully contributes towards theoretical bases of contemporary developments in society, business and related disciplines. The work submitted for publication consideration in JSDS should address empirical and theoretical contributions in the subjects related to the scope of the journal in particular and allied theories and practices in general. Scope of JSDS includes: sociology, psychology, anthropology, economics, political science, international relations, linguistics, history, public relations, hospitality & tourism and project management. Author(s) should declare that work submitted to the journal is original, not under consideration for publication by another journal and that all listed authors approve its submission to JSDS. It is JSDS policy to welcome submissions for consideration, which are original, and not under consideration for publication by another journal at the same time. Author (s) can submit: Research Paper, Conceptual Paper, Case Studies and Book Review. The current issue of JSDS consists of papers of scholars from Germany, Syria, Bangladesh, Tanzania and Thailand. Host Community Attitudes Towards Internally Displaced Persons, Stateless Rohingya Refugees in Bangladesh: Life and Livelihood Challenges, Social Learning Theory and Gender Representation in Leadership Positions and Food Insecurity in Thailand during the Coronavirus Pandemic are some of the major practices and concepts examined in these studies. Journal received research submission related to all aspects of major themes and tracks. All the submitted papers were first assessed, by the editorial team for relevance and originality of the work and blindly peer-reviewed by the external reviewers depending on the subject matter of the paper. After the rigorous peer-review process, the submitted papers were selected based on originality, significance, and clarity of the purpose. The current issue will therefore be a unique offer, where scholars will be able to appreciate the latest results in their field of expertise and to acquire additional knowledge in other relevant fields.

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

Description	Pages
Title	I
Editorial	II
Editorial Board	III
Table of Contents	IV
Papers	V
Host Community Attitudes Towards Internally Displaced Persons: Evidence from Al-Bab, Syria Musallam Abedtalas, Adnan Rashid Mamo	1
Stateless Rohingya Refugees in Bangladesh: Life and Livelihood Challenges Md Mostafa Faisal, Zobayer Ahmed	11
Social Learning Theory and Gender Representation in Leadership Positions: The Case of the Health Sector in Tanzania Zuena Kilugwe Khamis	24
Food Insecurity in Thailand during the Coronavirus Pandemic John Walsh, Petcharat Lovichakorntikul	34

PAPERS

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Host Community Attitudes Towards Internally Displaced Persons: Evidence from Al-Bab, Syria

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Abstract: Considering the unique context of the Al-Bab area in Syria hosting Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs), we tested the role of economic individual self-interest in shaping a host community's attitude towards IDPs. The findings from analyzing data collected from 496 households indicated that self-interest had a significant effect on their attitudes. Interestingly, when positive and negative attitudes were isolated from each other, the findings revealed that the factors shaping the former may not always be the same for the latter. The particular value of this study is in exploring the host community's attitude towards IDPs, something which has not been studied and thus contributes to enhancing our knowledge about the attitude towards newcomers.

Keywords: *Self-interest; Attitude; IDPs; Labour market.*

1. Introduction

In 2022 the Syrian crisis entered its twelfth year and has so far resulted in 13.4 million displaced people. There are 6.6 million refugees, who passed the international border to another country, distributed within neighbouring countries, Europe and North America (UNHCR, 2021). The IDPs (internally displaced people), who have been distributed within the home country, are 6.7 million (UNHCR, 2021). The ability of both refugees and internally displaced people to integrate, support themselves, and contribute positively to the host society depends to a significant extent on the attitude of the host community towards them (Dempster and Hargrave, 2017, Fussell, 2014). An understanding of hosts' attitudes towards refugees and IDPs is an important issue for enriching our knowledge of integration and sustainable development (Abedtalas et al., 2020). Likewise, a more nuanced knowledge of these relationships is important for governments, NGOs and international organizations to help them design more insightful policies and interventions (Abedtalas et al., 2021). Attitudes towards immigrants have been studied through the expected impact on the host community at two levels and from two perspectives, with considerable separation and convergence.

The economic perspective, related to competition in the labour market and financial (tax) burdens, has been studied mostly at the level of individuals, while the socioeconomic perspective, related to economic and sociocultural issues, has been studied mostly at the group level. Many researchers believe that attitudes towards immigrants are rooted in individual self-interest in both the narrow and the broad sense. In the narrow sense, it is assumed that individuals, in pursuit of their self-interest, take negative attitudes toward those in competition and conflict with them (Quillian, 1995). As for the broad sense, this can be extended to cover all facets of life in a society, such as social relationships and identity, that satisfy individual needs. The precondition for a negative attitude is a feeling of threat (Sides and Citrin, 2007). Fear of job loss or wage competition and concerns about the costs of social programmes are often cited as economic reasons for attitudes towards immigration. Other reasons are related to cultural alienation and fears that immigrants will undermine traditional languages, religion, share in political power, and other aspects of the host people's way of life.

More recently, scholars have tended to focus on the socioeconomic perspective. Such studies have investigated attitudes towards externally displaced people, where newcomers and hosts come from different socio-cultural backgrounds. This article questions whether the socioeconomic approach alone is able to adequately explain attitudes towards IDPs, Considering that self-interest can be mixed with group socioeconomic factors. this study deals with the attitude towards a specific group of newcomers, IDPs. As IDPs, in contrast to refugees or migrants, belong to the same country as the host community and often with similar sociocultural backgrounds, it is possible to isolate, to an extent, the role of socioeconomic factors and track the role of self-interest. The interaction between local people in the Al-Bab region of Syria and IDPs, where the two parties are Syrians with similar sociocultural backgrounds, affords a suitable case study to

apply this approach and retest the role of self-interest. The article begins with a literature review followed by sections on methodology, findings, and a conclusion.

2. Literature Review

Although we could not find studies of the attitudes towards IDPs, with think that we can draw on literature relating to attitudes towards minorities, migrants, and refugees, taking into account the implication of similarities and differences between them. The similarities are related to displacement and its ramification, while the differences are related to staying inside the home countries with a similar sociocultural context. In general, although there are elements that overlap, we can categorize two different approaches to theorising attitudes towards migrants (newcomers): economic and socioeconomic. The economic approach draws on theories of international trade, concentrating on the impact of migration on individual economic well-being through product prices and the competition in the labour market, especially for those with skills comparable to those of newcomers, as they will face more intense competition with limited opportunity for mobility comparing to capital (Scheve and Slaughter, 2001, Mayda, 2006, Hanson at al., 2007). Besides, there is the possibility that immigrants will have a negative impact through pressure on social security systems, paid for through taxation (Borjas, 1999, Facchini and Mayda, 2009, Hanson et al., 2007). Several scholars have investigated *subjective* indicators of individual economic interest. They have found that the role of economic self-interest cannot be separated from other interests and is less important than group-level factors. Citrin et al. (1997) tested the influence of economic factors on public opinion towards immigration policy in the USA. They indicated that personal economic conditions play a negligible role in shaping opinion, but beliefs about the state of the national economy and concern about taxes are important factors.

These findings were confirmed by Chandler and Tsai (2001). However, Hernes and Knudsen (1992) and Tucci (2005) emphasized that concerns about an individual's financial situation influence concerns about immigration. Meanwhile, Card et al. (2005), Citrin (2007), Dustmann and Preston (2007) and Preston (2007) indicated that attitudes towards migration are shaped by perspectives on a variety of ways through which migration affects concerns about the labour market, welfare (public finance), ethnic and cultural issues. Furthermore, Sides and Citrin (2007), Card et al. (2012) and Gordon (2016) revealed a stronger influence of cultural and national identity than individual economic interests. However, subjective indicators might be susceptible to the mixing of individual and group interests. Economic and social concerns about migration may be based in part on ignorance and/or the tendency of people to overemphasize anecdotal rather than systematic evidence about the impact of migration (Kessler, 2001, Semyonov et al., 2004, Card et al., 2007). Besides, those concerns differ according to the economic and social characteristics of immigrants and their hosts (Dustmann and Preston, 2007, Card et al., 2007). Using *objective* individual indicators of economic self-interest, Espenshade and Hempstead (1996), found that people with a higher income and education, as indicators of individual competitiveness in the labour market, are more receptive to higher levels of immigration. Likewise, Scheve and Slaughter (2001) documented a strong correlation between skills and labour market competitiveness and attitude towards immigration.

Although Kessler (2001) showed that the labour market factor determines the attitude towards immigration, he did not exclude the role of political beliefs. This was confirmed by Gang et al (2002), Mayda (2006), O'Rourke and Sinnott (2006) and Facchini and Mayda (2009). Finally, Hanson et al. (2007) concentrated on a fiscal perspective and studied the differences in preferences of American individuals towards immigration policies and concluded that high exposure to immigrant financial pressures, which translates into a higher tax burden, leads to hostility to the immigration flow, especially among highly skilled individuals. From a socioeconomic perspective, many theoretical models have been developed to explain the attitude towards immigrants. The Collective Threat Theory sees that the host group attitude is based on perceptions of threats to their privileges (Quillian, 1995), which may include political power and control over acceptable social and cultural behaviours (Card et al., 2007). While many of these threats are related to the struggle for economic resources from a collective perspective (Citrin et al., 1997), the Symbolic Policy Theory emphasizes the importance of values and identities (Fussell, 2014, Berg, 2015). Likewise, the Social Identity Theory also states that people tend to think positively of themselves and the groups to which they belong and differentiate themselves from strangers through the expression of negative attitudes (Ceobanu and Escandell, 2010). Following the socioeconomic approach, Quillian (1995) and Palmer (1996) found that anti-immigrant

attitudes were a result of a perceived economic and social threat to the dominant native group. In two interesting papers, Esses et al. (1998) used the model of real group conflict and revealed that group competition for economic resources shapes attitudes towards immigrants.

While Semyonov et al. (2004) focussed on the perceived threat and found that this mediates between a real threat and a negative attitude towards immigrants. Using symbolic theory, Pedersen (2005) showed that higher levels of education (as an indicator of socialization), right-wing political positions, high levels of national identity and increasing age explain, to a large extent, the negative attitude towards asylum seekers. Likewise, Pantoja, (2006) found that the core American values of individualism, humanity and equality shape public opinion toward US immigration policies. Similar findings were confirmed by Savelkoul et al. (2011) revealing the role of ethnicity in the formation of anti-Muslim attitudes in the Netherlands. In conclusion, there is an overlap between individual economic interests and group economic and social interests as well as the dynamic interaction between them. Furthermore, all of the studies deal with attitudes towards externally displaced people or minorities, where there are differences in the sociocultural backgrounds of the two parties that make newcomers a source of threat, which is not always the case with IDPs. Accordingly, studying the attitude of the Al-Bab host community toward IDPs, where the two parties share the same sociocultural background, can isolate the concerns of group identity and help in developing our understanding of attitudes towards newcomers. So we will test the following hypothesis: Economic self-interest affect the local attitude towards IDPs.

3. Methodology

Al-Bab is an agricultural region around the city of Al-Bab, in North West Syria. It is affiliated administratively with the Governorate of Aleppo. It is currently controlled by opposition forces allied with Turkey. Unfortunately, there is not any census or trustable data about the area recently. The first wave of IDPs to Al-Bab came from the wider metropolitan area of Aleppo. They included large numbers of people who had previously migrated there from rural areas, as well as to other cities, in search of education and work (Balanche 2017). Due to its relative stability, the Al-Bab region continued to receive waves of IDPs from the Aleppo, Homs and Deir Ezzor regions (Support Coordination Unit, 2017). There are no reliable estimates of the number of IDPs in the region, but the personal observations of the two authors indicate that, on average, the ratio of local people to IDPs is less than 3 to 1. The IDPs are distributed between the city of Al-Bab, smaller towns and the countryside. Some of them live in scattered camps on the outskirts of towns and villages, while others live in rented housing (Enab Baladi 2017). Given that the IDPs are Syrians, some of them are even originally from the Al-Bab region.

There are few differences between them and the host communities in terms of their general social and cultural identity that might provoke conflict between them as groups. However, there will be individual competition for economic resources. In addition, no government migration policy might influence the host communities' attitudes, positively or negatively, towards IDPs. Accordingly, Al-Bab is a good place to test the explanatory capability of the economic self-interest approach for host community attitudes towards IDPs. We choose a quantitative method as we had specific variables (Cohin et al., 2002) expected to affect the attitude towards IDPs. As people in the region tend to be suspicious of strangers, especially those collecting data, random sampling was impossible and we had to use snowball sampling. The researchers identified a limited number of individuals who had an interest in the topic and these people were then used as informants to identify other individuals and/or communicate with new contacts (Cohin et al., 2002). We began by choosing eleven research assistants through focus groups. Each had an extensive social network in the area and had an adequate educational level. They used their social networks as a way of convincing people to fill out the questionnaire.

Five hundred completed questionnaires were returned by the heads of households from Al-Bab city, Qabbasin town, and Qubbat Al-Shih village. Four hundred and ninety-six of the questionnaires were acceptable for statistical analysis. As we were interested in economic factors and self-interest, and given the absence of taxation and social security systems, we excluded tax concerns and focused on competition in the labour market. Our underlying hypothesis was that whoever suffers from poor employability in the labour market, or more intense competition in the labour market will hold a negative attitude towards IDPs (Hernes and

Knudsen, 1992). Therefore, the independent variables were education, as a proxy of an individual's human skills, along with gender, age, employment status, income level and source (McLaren and Johnson, 2007, Wilkes, et al., 2008), as well as the place of residence (among the three sites from which the data was collected). Regarding the dependent variable (host community attitude towards IDPs).

We used a question about the possibility of settling IDPs in the region. The answers to this question were on the Likert five-point scale: Strongly Agree: 5; Agree: 4; Neutral : 3; Disagree: 2; Strongly Disagree: 1. Dependingly, a questionnaire was prepared in Arabic containing demographics questions and questions related to the other variables. The initial version of the questionnaire was reviewed by three colleagues, academics ar Mardin Artuklu University, interested in this field, after that we made some marginal adjustments. Then we tested the questionnaire by filling it by 10 local people and we made some changes to make the language more accurately understandable. We estimated three regressions. Model (1) is a linear regression model of the attitude on the independent variables. And regression models (2) and (3) are logistic binaries, with the same variables but based on the method of Wilkes et al. (2008), which, in turn, drew on Cacioppo et al. (1997). Cacioppo et al. (1997) considered that attitudes towards refugees do not sit on a continuum between negative and positive poles, but rather, both negative and positive attitudes are qualitatively different positions. Therefore, we calculated two new dummy variables, which are the negative and positive attitudes towards IDPs. The negative attitude takes the value 1 when the answer to the attitude question is *strongly disagree* and *disagree*, and 0 otherwise.

Likewise, for a positive attitude, it takes the value 1 when the answer to the attitude question is *strongly agree* and *agree* and 0 otherwise. The purpose of these two regression models is to understand whether the positive and negative attitudes are formed independently and to know if there really are significant differences between them. Model 1 takes the following form:

$$Y = a + \beta X + u$$

Where:

Y is the dependent variable which measures the attitude, X represents the independent variables, α is the intercept, β are unknown parameters to be estimated and u is the error term. Models 2 and 3 take the following form:

$$\log\left(\frac{p_1}{1-p_1}\right) = \beta_0 + \beta_1 X_1 + \ldots\ldots\ldots \beta_I X_I$$

Where: p_1 is the probability that Y (the dependent variable) =1 (the event), given X_1 ... X_I are the covariates (predictors) and βs are the regression coefficients, which have to be estimated from the data (Wilson and Lorenz, 2015).

4. Findings

Table 1 shows the demographic and socioeconomic characteristics of the sample. A large share of the sample was collected from the village of Qubbat al-Shih, followed by the city of Al-Bab and then the town of Qabasin, and is dominated by males, which is unsurprising given that social norms in the region usually entrust family leadership to men. With regard to age, younger groups predominate; this corresponds with the demographic composition of Syria. However, the exception is the under-25s group which is very low by Syrian standards and may be the result of youth migration. For education level, there is a high degree of illiteracy, but also a good percentage of the higher educated. The unemployment rate is 14.1%, which is a high percentage. There is a high percentage of employers, which is normal given that most of the economic activities in the region are small businesses, crafts and agriculture. Regarding the sectorial distribution of activities, it is meaningful to compare it with the official Syrian statistics of sectorial activities for the year 2009, which were as follows: Agriculture: 16%, industry 36%, construction 6%, services 44% (Syria Statistic Collection, 2011). In our sample the agricultural sector represents 14% which is a significant decline compared with 2009, indicating the deterioration of the agricultural sector as a result of the war, the lack of supplies, fuel and marketing capabilities.

As for the industrial sector (and considering that the 2009 data incorporates Other into Industrial), about 42.3% of the sample are fully or partially employed in this sector, compared to the 2009 average of 36%, which included the oil industry. There is thus a remarkable increase in industrial activities resulting from the displacement of many industrial activities from the city of Aleppo towards rural areas, including Al-Bab. In addition, the division of Syria between different de facto authorities forced isolated regions such as Al-Bab to develop many industrial activities. The construction sector has also experienced some expansion, which is related to the increase in population resulting from displacement. Regarding services, there is a decline since 2009, which is mostly due to the absence of official government agencies. With regard to sources of income, the majority depends on wages, followed by profits and various sources of aid, as well as remittances from abroad. About income groups, about 56.4% have an income of between zero and 220,000 Syrian pounds (440 US dollars in 2019) per month.

Table 1: The Samples Demographic Characteristics

Places				
Albab	**Qubasin**	**Qubeshih**		
30%	23.60%	46.40%		
Gender				
Male	**Female**			
82.50%	17.50%			
Age				
≤25	**26-35**	**36-45**	**46-55**	**≥56**
15.50%	35.70%	23.40%	14.90%	10.50%
Education				
Illiterate	**elementary**	**preparatory**	**Secondary**	**Higher education**
14.30%	25.60%	24.60%	9.90%	25.60%
Work Status				
Employer(and self-employed)	**Employee**	**Unemployed**		
38.70%	51.40%	14.10%		
Sector				
Agriculture	**Industry**	**Construction**	**Service**	**Other**
13.70%	12.30%	11.50%	40.10%	31%
Income resource				
Wage	**Profit**	**Remittances**	**Other**	
50%	44.20%	8.70%	12.30%	
Income groups*				
1	**2**	**3**	**4**	**5**
56.40%	33.70%	6.50%	1.40%	2.00%

*For income groups, measured by monthly Syrian Pound income, 1: 0-220000, 2:220001-440000, 3:440001-660000, 4:660001-880000 and 5:880000 and more.

In Table 2 there are three regression models. Model 1 is a linear regression of the attitude towards IDPs, as a range between negative and positive, on the independent variables that were previously defined. That is, we consider the negative attitude as the opposite of the positive, with both resulting from the same underlying process. As we can see from the table, the significant coefficients are that of age, level of education, agricultural sector, other sources of income and the location of Qubashih and Al-Bab (two out of three data collection sites).

Older Adults are Negative Towards IDPs: Attitudes appear to increase negatively with increasing age, as indicated by the negative sign of the regression coefficient. This means that older local people are negative towards IDPs compared with younger adults. In the context of Al-Bab, we do not believe that the negative

attitude of older hosts can be explained by the argument of O'Rourke and Sinnott (2006) that the elderly are conservative towards the social change represented by the newcomers, given that both the displaced and the hosts share the same social background. Likewise, the negative attitude cannot be the result of what Hernes and Knudsen (1992) proposed about competition for social benefits between the displaced and the elderly, given that there is no system of social security nor assistance for IDPs provided by the government or any other official body. We believe this can be explained by competition in the labour market, which is more intense among older groups and less so among the younger groups, a result of the massive migration of young people outside the country (as we noted from the age structure of the sample previously) and the recruitment of young males into military forces.

Table 2: Regression Models

	Model 1 Linear Regression for Attitude as Dependent Variable		**Model 2 Binary Logistic Regression for Positive Attitude as Dependent Variable**		**Model 3 Binary Logistic Regression for Negative Attitude as Dependent Variable**	
	B	P	B	P	β	P
(Constant)	3.792*	0.000	0.775	0.349	-1.960**	0.027
Age	-0.140*	0.007	-0.250*	0.008	0.222**	0.032
Gender	-0.321	0.075	-0.429	0.190	0.551	0.118
Education	-0.103**	0.028	-0.105	0.217	0.196**	0.031
Unemployed (reference Employed)	0.048	0.828	-0.303	0.463	-0.617	0.169
Employee (reference employer)	0.010	0.953	-0.342	0.238	-0.214	0.483
Sectors (reference service sector)						
Agriculture	-0.847*	0.000	-1.317*	0.001	0.1337*	0.00
Industry	0.043	0.816	0.210	0.522	-0.084	0.818
Construction	0.152	0.461	0.398	0.276	-0.274	0.500
Other	-0.122	0.382	-0.021	0.933	0.273	0.312
Income resources (reference profit)						
Wage	-0.047	0.765	0.111	0.700	0.136	0.655
Remittances	-0.195	0.406	-0.545	0.234	0.373	0.422
Other	0.462**	0.025	0.853**	0.026	-0.669	0.116
Income groups	0.053	0.459	0.127	0.334	-0.070	0.634
Place (reference Qubasin)						
Qubashih	0.604*	0.00	0.902*	0.002	-1.171*	0.00
Albab	1.098*	0.00	1.492*	0.000	-1.645*	0.00
	Adjusted R^2	**0.17**	**Cox & Snell R Square**	**0.157**	**Cox & Snell R Square**	**0.151**
			Nagelkerke R Square	**0.218**	**Nagelkerke R Square**	**0.202**

(P) is the level of significance, * significant at level 0.01. ** significant at level 0.05.

More Educated People have Negative Attitudes Towards IDPs: It appears from the table that there is an inverse association between the level of education and the degree of acceptance of the IDPs. This is in contrast to most of the studies conducted so far, whether on the economic or non-economic background. In contrast to Hernes and Knudsen (1992), our study found that educated hosts did not appear to be more tolerant, nor did they try to appear more tolerant than they were, as Burns and Gimpel (2000) predicted. On the contrary, they are more negative towards IDPs. Hanson et al. (2007) and Mayda (2006) used international trade theory and individual interest and also found tolerance correlated with education level. However, they investigated hostility based on low-skilled competition. Our findings show similar hostility based on competition for jobs, but at a higher skill level. As we mentioned earlier, we expect that the IDPs in our region of study may have a higher level of education and skills, considering they came from more urbanized areas. Therefore, competition between highly-skilled individuals is more intense, and the more educated the host, the more negative the attitude towards IDPs. This is not outside the implications of international trade theory on the labour market, in terms of the possibility of skilled labour migration to countries that have a density of unskilled labour but lack capital.

People Working in Agricultural Sector are Negative Towards IDPs: The coefficient of the agricultural sector was negative and significant, showing that workers in the agricultural sector are more hostile to the displaced than in other sectors. This is related to the deterioration that the agricultural sector has undergone due to the war, combined with years of drought, and the lack of agricultural supplies and fuel. Likewise, some agricultural production workers are specialized and their ability to move to other sectors is limited. So it is common for workers in the agricultural sector to feel weak in the labour market and to take a negative attitude towards real or potential competition from IDPs. This result is consistent with research relying on theories of international trade (Facchini and Mayda, 2009) and individual interest, and what was confirmed by Dancygier and Donnelly (2013) about the monetary cost of moving from one sector to another. It is also consistent with Lee and Wolpin (2006)'s finding about the psychological costs, such as anxiety and stress, of moving from one sector to another.

People who Receive Aid are Positive Towards IDPs: Regarding income, only those with "other sources of income" (consisting mainly of aid) have a significant positive attitude. The comment that we can make here is that a large proportion of the flow of aid is linked to the influx and presence of the IDPs in the region. Therefore, it would not be unusual for beneficiaries of this aid to have a positive attitude towards IDPs.

Host Community Members who Live in Urban Centers are Positive Towards IDPs: When we look at particular localities, it seems that Al-Bab city has the most positive attitude, followed by the village of Qubbat Al-Shih and then the town of Qabasin. This coincides partially with our basic expectation, drawing on Burns and Gimpel (2000), that the closer to urban areas, the more positive the attitude towards IDPs, considering the more abundant economic opportunity and the less labour competition. Furthermore, this finding agrees with Czaika and Di Lillo (2018) that there are differences in attitude related to location. We believe that the reason for the greater negativity in the town of Qabasin towards IDPs, as reported by the residents, is due to the heritage of frequent conflict over ownership of land and buildings. This issue was not reported from the village of Qubbat Al-Shih.

The Development Process of Positive and Negative Attitudes Towards IDPs Might Be Partially Separated: In Model 2, which is a binary logistic regression for a positive attitude, we find that the significant coefficients are only those of age, the agricultural sector, other sources of income and place. In Model 3, which is a binary logistic regression for the negative attitude, the significant coefficients were that of age, education and place. The trends are not different from those mentioned in Model 1, which supports the above findings. However, what can be observed is the absence of education in the formation of a positive attitude, and other sources of income from the formation of a negative attitude, which may lead to the conclusion that the composition of positive and negative attitudes may be distinct and that they may also overlap due to the presence of common factors. This agrees with Wilkes et al. (2008).

5. Conclusion and Recomendations

In this study, we tested the validity of the theory of economic self-interest in explaining host community attitudes towards IDPs in Syria. We relied on previous studies, especially those based on international trade theory, in explaining negative attitudes towards IDPs, with the indicators of competition for economic resources, especially in the labour market. Our indicators of the exposure of individual interest to the competition were the level of human skills measured by educational level, in addition to some indicators of weakness in the context of economic competition, namely, age, gender, source of income, work status, activity sector and income level. In addition, we tested the effect of place of residence between the countryside and the city. We estimated two types of regression. Firstly, a linear regression of the general attitude towards IDPs, and secondly, two logistical regressions, after dividing the attitudes into negative and positive. We found that the indicators of economic self-interest play an important role in shaping attitudes towards IDPs. Higher levels of education are associated with a negative attitude towards IDPs, which is consistent with the results of studies that have been based on the theory of international trade. Likewise, some other indicators of economic vulnerability, such as age plus reduction in an activity sector, play a negative role in attitudes towards IDPs. On the other hand, receiving aid has a positive effect on host community attitudes.

All of this supports the idea that self-interest plays an important role in the formation of attitudes towards IDPs. It was also concluded that the process of forming a negative attitude may be separated, in some aspects, from the process of forming a positive attitude. This is because education did not play a role in forming a positive attitude, while income from aid did not affect the negative position. At the same time, there are common aspects related to the effects of age, economic sector and place. Finally, we found that place of residence may affect attitudes towards IDPs and that urban areas, with more abundant economic opportunities, may hold more positive attitudes. In general, our findings are in contrast with Hainmueller and Hopkins' (2013) claim that the economic self-interest approach, which depends on the theory of competition in the labour market and the financial burdens of hosting newcomers, is a kind of zombie theory, because of the insistence of scholars on using it, even while it lacked the support of empirical evidence. Our results mean, rather, that the insistence of some researchers on relying on individual self-interest is not absurd, and that the lack of supporting evidence results from the methodologies of approaching the subject and the contexts of carrying out the relevant studies.

So we confirmed our hypothesis that self-interest can, besides other factors, explain host community attitudes towards IDPs. We believe that those interested in the relationship between IDPs and host communities, Scholars and practitioners, must take the self-interest factor into account. The intervention policies should focus on creating economic opportunities for both parties, IDPs and locals, simultaneously, and providing support to the sectors most affected by the crisis, such as agriculture, health, education and public utilities. Such an approach can make these sectors levers for improved understanding between the two parties instead of being the basis for conflict. The data for this study was collected to measure host communities' attitudes towards IDPs and concentrate our analysis on competition in the labour market. Accordingly, we suggest for future research surveys comparative samples of hosts and IDPs to allow for a better understanding of the dimensions of economic competition between them. Furthermore, it would be very beneficial, for comparative knowledge about attitudes towards IDPs and refugees, to study convergent samples on both sides of the Turkish-Syrian border.

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Stateless Rohingya Refugees in Bangladesh: Life and Livelihood Challenges

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Abstract: Rohingya is one of the most persecuted ethnic minority groups in the world, as identified by United Nations. More than one million Rohingya refugees, over half of whom are children, live at various camps in Cox's Bazar district in Bangladesh. This study uses a mixed methodology approach based on primary data to examine the life and livelihood challenges of Rohingya people in the refugee camps. The study's findings reveal that there is a severe scarcity of basic human needs in the Rohingya camps and a prevalence of widespread human rights violations. Among the life and livelihood challenges in the camps are- poor health services, the weak structure of shelter, scarcity of nutritious food, inadequate water and sanitation infrastructure, lack of education facilities after secondary school, gender-based violence, insecurity, congestion and lack of privacy, limited freedom of movement, and high risk of landslide. The study's findings may guide governments and NGOs operating in Rohingya camps to ensure the community's basic needs and human rights.

Keywords: *Rohingya, Refugee camps, Livelihood, Bangladesh, Myanmar.*

1. Introduction

Myanmar generates the most refugees (1.2 million) in South Asia, and Bangladesh is one of the significant refugee-hosting nations (Kudrat-E-Khuda, 2020). After August 25, 2017, around 1 million Rohingya refugees escaped from Myanmar to Bangladesh (M. A. Uddin, 2021). However, six decades of state-sponsored ethnic cleansing were carried out by the military, and they were denied access to all types of citizen facilities based on their ethnicity. Due to these circumstances, they were forced to migrate to Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Malaysia, India, Thailand, Indonesia, the UAE, and other countries (Shivakoti, 2017). Since then, an estimated 745,000 Rohingya people have fled to Cox's Bazar, including over 400,000 children. There was a Rohingya influx in 1978, 1991–1992, and 2016. Women, girls, boys, and men of the Rohingya ethnic group were pushed into Bangladesh due to this persecution; the military also killed men and boys. With this oppression towards the Muslim minority and the intensity of the violence, the most incredible and quickest refugee migration into Bangladesh occurred in August 2017 (Ty, 2019). On August 25, 2017, a significant number of Rohingya were forced to evacuate their homes in Myanmar and cross the border into Bangladesh to avoid severe ethnic violence (UNHCR, 2017)(Masood & Uddin, 2020). The government of Bangladesh took in around one million Myanmar nationals called "Forcibly Displaced" (Chowdury, 2018). Nevertheless, since Bangladesh was not a member of the Refugee Convention in 1951, the Rohingya are not considered refugees.

Even though the government of Bangladesh has kept its borders open, refugees are nonetheless unable to get formal legal status, are subject to severe movement limitations, and are unable to find employment legally (ACAPS, 2017; Karin, 2020). They lack access to basic necessities and human rights while residing in hurriedly built shelters known as refugee camps. Due to security concerns, the Rohingyas are constrained to living in camps and are unable to return to their homes in Myanmar. Apart from various studies on the Rohingya crisis, the present study aims to address the life and livelihood challenges faced by the displaced people living in the camps. The majority of Rohingya people have been living in the camps since 2017; they are hosted by the Bangladesh government and international donor agencies (Syed Magfur & Nasruzzaman, 2020). But their situation, day by day, is getting beyond control. Donor agencies focus on maintaining living standards and working for various awareness and rights programs, indicating that their situations are getting out of control. By this time, more than 500,000 Rohingyas had unlawfully obtained Bangladeshi national identities and were on the run-in countries, including Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Dubai, and Oman. These two ways, internal and external dangers, are becoming more difficult for the Bangladesh government to control (Ubayasiri, 2019). Historical evidence indicates that Muslims were first established in the Arakan region in the eighth century (Mohajan, 2018; Dadan & Fuad, 2018). For more than 350 years, until the Burmese takeover of Arakan in 1784.

They were the dominant power in the Arakan state (1430-1784 AD), Chittagong, Bengal, and some regions of India (Fuad & Dadan, 2022). Furthermore, Myanmar won its independence from Britain in 1948, shortly after the conclusion of the Second World War. The country has traditionally functioned as a parliamentary democracy since its inception. When military ruler Ne Win took control in 1962, this democratic process was ineffective (Knuters, 2018). Furthermore, it is known that the first migration under coercion took place in 1978, and subsequent migrations under coercion took place on many occasions in 1992, 2012, 2014, and 2016. Hence, given the context of the Rohingya community living in Bangladesh, the present paper is organized into five sub-sections. Following the introduction, a detailed literature review is presented, followed by the methodology of the study. The study concludes with a conclusion, presenting the findings and discussion section.

2. Literature Review

Demography of Arakan: Arakan is home to two notable ethnic groups: the Maghs and the Rohingya. The majority of the population, known as the Rohingya, practice the Islamic religion (Al Marjuk, 2022; Parnini, 2013). On the other side, the Maghs or Rakhains were a small group that adhered to the Buddhist faith. They had ties to the ancient Indian kingdom of Magadha, which is a source of information that more than satisfies our requirements. Before 1942, the Rohingyas and the Maghs had dominated the Arakan region, including every square inch of it (Dadan & Fuad, 2018). While the anti-Muslim riots that occurred in 1942 in Arakan, the Muslims of the region were driven to the southern section of the region. The hilly terrain of Arakan is home to a negligible number of the region's indigenous peoples' tribes, for instance, Mros, Kamis, Chaungthas, Chins, Saaks, Ahnus, Chaws, Khaungtsos, and Kons.

History of Rohingya Influx: The history of the Rohingya people and the history of Myanmar are intertwined. Myanmar officially recognizes 135 different races; however, certain groups, including the Rohingya, remain unregistered. Myanmar is, indeed, the most populous nation in South Asia in terms of ethnic diversity (Mohajan, 2018). Previously, Myanmar had a reputation for being a wealthy nation, and it was often referred to as the "rice bowl of Asia." It has abundant natural resources, including oil, coal, lead, tin, wood, hydropower, and others (CIA,2013). Its economic condition has deteriorated because of internal political instability, a dearth of human rights protections, international sanctions, and a lack of investment from outside sources (Ganesan & Hlaing, 2007). But as of the right moment, 32 percent of individuals live below the poverty line. Additionally, Myanmar has struggled with two issues: the absence of a democratic government that is responsible to its citizens and conflicts over minority rights. Due exclusively to these problems, Myanmar has been included on the UN's list of least developed nations since 1987. Myanmar is ranked 148th out of 187 nations in the Human Development Index published by the United Nations Development Program (M. D. M. Faisal, 2020; UNDP, 2019). The capital of Myanmar is Yangon, and Burmese is recognized as the country's primary language. It is bounded to the north by China, to the south by the Andaman Sea and to the east by the Bay of Bengal.

To the southeast, it is bounded by Thailand, to the east by Laos, and to the west by India and Bangladesh. The Yangon Region, the Mandalay Region, the Magway Region, the Sagaing Region, the Bago Region, the Ayeyarwady Region, and the Taninthayi Region are the seven regions that make up this country. In addition, Myanmar is divided into seven states that go by the names of Kachin, Kayin, Kayah, Rakhine, Chin, Shan, and Mon. Estimates place the population at 60,584,650, not including the Rohingya, and the landmass at around 261,000 square miles, or 676,578 square kilometers (Mohajan, 2018). Formally, the government of Myanmar acknowledges a total of eight distinct ethnic groups. Burman, Karen, Mon, Rakhine, Karenni, Kachin, Chin, and Shan are the names of these groups of people. Sub-ethnic groupings exist inside each ethnic group (Than, 2007). The Burmans make up 68% of the overall population, making them the largest ethnic group in the country. Shan people make up 9% of the population, Rakhine people 4%, Karen people 7%, Chinese people 3%, Mon people 2%, Indian people 2%, and other people 5%. They did not formally recognize the Rohingya people as legitimate citizens. The geographic region that is considered to be the heart of Myanmar is home to the Burman people. The Kachin, Rakhine, Shan, and Chin people, together with members of other ethnic groups, are predominantly concentrated in areas close to the territories that divide the nations. Some of the minority ethnic groups have a presence on both sides of the border with the nations that surround them.

Table 1: Ethnic Groups Covered Areas

Ethnicity	Percentage
Burman	68%
Shan	9%
Karen	7%
Rakhaine	4%
Indian	2%
Chinese	3%
Mon	2%
Others	5%
Total	100%

(Ullah, 2011).

Myanmar's government has declared it a Buddhist state (Biver, 2014). 89% of the population is Buddhist, 4% is Muslim, 4% is Christian, 1% is an animist, and 2% adhere to some other religious tradition out of the total 60 million people. Most people speak Burmese. There are about 200 languages and dialects that are spoken by many groups are minorities.

Relocation in Bangladesh: In August 2017, a beautiful coastal region comprised of two sub-districts with a combined population of 300.000 people witnessed the beginning of what would become a one-million-strong migration of Rohingya refugees leaving Myanmar. People have begun to haphazardly settle on the slopes of the Chittagong rainforest, chop down trees, and clear land (Uddin & Nesa, 2021). In the vicinity of the well-known beaches of Bengal Bay, individuals have been known to construct makeshift homes using almost nothing. There are now around 900,000 Myanmar refugees in Bangladesh, and humanitarian groups are struggling to cope with the magnitude of the problem due to the higher number of refugees (Arslan, Islam, Nahar, & Cansu, 2022). Also, more than half of the Rohingya refugees who are now housed in the camps are children. The monsoon season began in June, which contributed to the escalation of the humanitarian situation. This was due to the fact that heavy rain, high winds, floods, and landslides were responsible for inflicting damage on the refugee shelters. Despite ongoing relocations to safer ground, the camps in Cox's Bazar continue to be very crowded, with just 10.7 square meters available to each individual occupant (M. M. Faisal & Ullah, 2020). More land will need to be acquired to make room for these refugees, which will be difficult to do in one of the countries with the highest population density (Kolstad, 2018).

Response by the Local and International Community: Muslims who call Myanmar home but do not have Myanmar citizenship are known as Rohingya. The most recent departure occurred on August 25, 2017, when violence erupted in the Rakhine State of Myanmar. As a result, more than 742,000 people were forced to escape to Bangladesh (McCaffrie, 2019). Many refugees entered the country during the first three months while the crisis was in effect. A rough estimate puts the number of new arrivals in Bangladesh during the first half of 2018 at 12,000. Most persons arriving in Bangladesh are females and children, with more than forty percent being under the age of twelve (Afrin, 2022). The majority of the remaining people are older people who need more support and protection. They need everything severely, yet they have nothing to offer (Samarasekera, 2021). During the most recent crisis, the government of Bangladesh has been of assistance. The immigrants have also been welcomed into the rural areas of Bangladesh. They made every attempt to help, which strained their already limited available resources. In the aftermath of the monsoon rains, the humanitarian response in Bangladesh is still centered on meeting the country's enormous humanitarian needs and mitigating the consequences of the rains.

However, more international assistance is urgently required to move beyond humanitarian and day-to-day assistance and toward addressing medium-term challenges such as resilience, education, registration, and programs to protect the most vulnerable refugees: children, women, and people with special needs. This assistance must move beyond humanitarian and day-to-day assistance and address medium-term challenges (UNDP, 2019). The Inter Sector Coordinating Group (ISCG), the group coordinating responses to the Rohingya humanitarian crisis, stated: "The international community has given $340 million to the 2021 JRP, which corresponds to more than 35 percent of the whole demands." The Rohingya refugee crisis in Bangladesh,

which is now in its fourth year, has prompted aid organizations to send a unified plea to the international community, requesting that more assistance be provided (Arslan, Islam, Nahar & Cansu, 2022). The United States of America has pledged around 155 million dollars for the relief efforts, raising the total amount of humanitarian assistance provided by the US since 2017 to more than 1.3 billion dollars, including more than 1.1 billion dollars for programs in Bangladesh. Since the beginning of the crisis in 2017, as much as $2.32 billion has been promised to many different JRPs. During the previous four years, protecting Rohingya refugee settlements and the towns that hosted them required almost 69% of the total funding. To assist the Rohingya refugees and the people hosting them in Cox's Bazar, the United Nations requested more than one billion dollars last year. By the end of 2020, however, only 59.4 percent of the funding objective for this appeal has been raised.

Rohingya Camp Narratives: Since the present study aims to explore the life and livelihood-related problems and challenges in the Rohingya camps in Bangladesh, in this section, we tried to analyze the previous studies that focused on similar issues. A recently published book titled 'Rohingya Camp Narratives: Tales From the Lesser Roads Traveled', edited by Hussain (2022) covers human security, children's education, innovation, camp entry, and relocation plans of the Rohingya refugees living in Bangladesh. Among the recent studies, Akter (2022) tried to explore gender-based violence in the Rohingya camps. She claimed that there is sexual- and gender-based violence (SGBV) in the Rohingya camp that is committed by multiple stakeholders. Moreover, there are challenges and dilemmas related to primary education for Rohingya children in the camp areas (Suma, 2022).

3. Methodology

This research utilized both primary and secondary data and qualitative and quantitative mixed approaches. The research aimed to address one central question. What kind of crises and challenges are facing Rohingya refugees in the host country? Kutupalong expansion camp was selected for this study, and data were collected from January 29 to February 8, 2018. It is the largest camp in Cox'sBazar located in Ukhia Upazila's Raja Palong Union. Primary data was gathered through both structured and semi-structured questionnaires (Chowdhury, Oakkas, & Ahmmed, 2022; Choy, 2014). Besides, two Key Informant Interviews (KIIs) were conducted to validate the data (Akhter, 2022; Ara, Shahed, Rahman, Ahmad, & Das, 2020). Recent papers, peer-reviewed journals, reviews, academic reports, and books are included in the secondary data. Related literature is mainly collected through internet browsing. One hundred-five respondents from the Kutupalong expansion refugee camp participated in the survey. Interviews were conducted with five refugees, two Bangladeshi community members, and two Rohingya students studying for their post-graduation in Turkey. Moreover, questions were raised in the local languages of Chittagong and Bengali. The respondents were aged between 18 and 80. The questionnaire aimed to locate demographic details such as gender, age, marital status, Ethnic Group, educational level, past occupation in Myanmar and current occupation in Bangladesh.

And their views on health, education, housing, food, and freedom of movement. Regarding the sampling technique, we favored non-probability sampling (Moniruzzaman & Al-Muaalemi, 2022). This sampling technique is obtained representative of the population, and the researcher chooses samples based on experience and expertise. The sample is based on the case and convenience considerations in such a sampling technique. Among the four non-probability sampling types (convenience sampling, quota sampling, consecutive sampling, judgmental sampling), judgmental sampling was favorable, which more commonly selects only individuals they consider eligible to participate in the research. After data collection, the questionnaires were reviewed multiple times to check if they were thoroughly filled in. Ethical principles were considered during the data collection phase. Whenever the researcher spoke to a field respondent, he tried to take informed consent. During data collection, absolute confidentiality was maintained; the respondents' names were not revealed, and the data was accurate. Bangladesh army and security forces generated issues many times during data collection. Some refugee women mainly rejected us for speaking without a female interpreter. Moreover, when asked about sexual harassment, some women kept silent.

4. Findings

About 1 million Rohingya refugees live in Cox's Bazar district of Bangladesh. The Rohingya people have been fleeing to Bangladesh from Myanmar's Rakhine state for the past 40 years due to racial and religious discrimination by the government and the Buddhist mob (Ana, 2010) For generations, they were deprived of their citizenship, identity, fundamental rights, etc. After fleeing, they have been facing several crises and challenges in the host country, although the Bangladesh government and global and national organizations are trying to protect their rights.

Demography of Cox Bazar Refugee Camps: 58 (55%) males and 47(45%) females in refugee camps were interviewed non-probability sampling basis. All the respondents were adults, and their ages were between 18 to 80 years. Around 86% of the respondents were married, whereas 96% were women and 76% were men. Comparatively, more female respondents were married than males.

Education Level and Profession: Among the respondents, 21.9% male and 22.22% female had no education. However, 10.5% of males and 11.4% of females had only Quranic education from informal Madrasa. On the other hand, 11.4% of males and 19.95% of females passed primary education. Only 19% of males and 18.05% of females completed high school education. Further, 17.1% of males and 14.25% of females had a secondary certificate. 11.4% of males and 8.58% of females passed higher Secondary, 5.7% of males and 4.75% of females completed graduation and 2.9% of males and 0.8% of females completed post-graduation. Males were more educated than females.

Figure 1: Education Level of Rohingya People



Among the 58 male respondents, 12.1% was farmer, 1.7% was college teacher, 3.4% was school teacher, 5.2% was primary school teacher, 13.8 was businessman, 19% was the seller of goods, 15.55% was NGO worker, 3.4% was driver, 10.4% was fisherman, 1.7% was guard, 3.4% was doctor, 1.7% was barber, 3.4% cleaner and 5.2% was in other professions (woodcutter, goldsmith and beggar. Together 75% of Rohingya people were farmers, business people, sellers, fishermen and NGO workers.

Right to Education in the Camps: Following the inflow in 2017, the government of Bangladesh, the United Nations, and several non-governmental organizations are working together to provide education to Rohingya children. However, their rights are severely constrained in the refugee camps in Cox's Bazar, Bangladesh. The Refugee Relief and Repatriation Commission (RRRC) and the Bangladesh Government's Policy is that formal education is not authorized in Bangladeshi Schools, as stated in the Join Rapid Needs assessment report (UNHCR, 2018)). They result from secondary schooling, college education, and further academic study. The office of the Prime Minister of Bangladesh has sent a warning to the Cox's Bazar district, instructing them to take the initiative against unlawful Rohingya children enrolled in various schools (Relief Web, 2019). The refugees were questioned on their perspectives on the school system's core issues.

Figure 2: Basic Problems in Education Sector



Among the respondents, 35.24% said the prohibition of formal education is the main problem, 13.33% on the prohibition of higher education, 11.43% on learning centers related problems, 4.76% teachers' problems, 9.52% lack of school, 4.76% unstructured educational problems, 7.62% on learning materials, 6.67% on far from home and 6.67% on other problems. These are the critical obstacles to accessing education. According to the report of Relief web, "On January 23, the Bangladeshi official responsible for refugee issues in Cox's Bazar made notice to the directors of seven secondary schools in Teknaf and Ukhiya to take strict initiative so that Rohingya children cannot attend any Bangladeshi educational institutions outside the camps" (Shohel, 2022). From 1990 to 2017, many students passed Higher Secondary Certificate (HSC) and came to Bangladesh, but higher education was prohibited. Among them, some continue teaching professions in the learning center of the camps, some are illegally admitted to Chittagong-based universities or colleges, and some collect Bangladeshi passports and leave another country for higher education. Moreover, some Rohingya children born in Bangladesh after 1990 completed HSC from Bangladesh but are afraid of their higher education in Bangladeshi universities or colleges.

A respondent said*, "His family came to Bangladesh after 1990. He has born in Bangladesh. Later, his Rohingya family obtained Bangladeshi birth certificates and other documents to allow his education and other facilities as Bangladeshi nationality". (In-depth interview by Author, Rohingya boy from Refugee Camp, Kutupalong expansion side, Cox's Bazar)*. Many graduate students came to Bangladesh and failed to continue their master's at Bangladeshi universities. So, some of them came out of the country in illegal ways. One of the Rohingya students studying in Turkey came to Bangladesh on October 25, 2017. The Myanmar military force killed his father, wife, six-year-old son, and two-year-old daughter. They raped his wife and burnt her with two children. A respondent said, "I came to Turkey through airport contact; though I had a Bangladeshi passport, the airport authority treated me as Rohingya. Our three friends paid 12 lakh (14300 US dollars) Bangladeshi Taka. After payment, they released us, and we took the plane" (In-depth interview by Author, Rohingya student from Ankara, Turkey***).*** Rahima Akter Khushi, 20 years of Rohingya girl, was born and raised in Cox's Bazar Balukhali refugee camp in Bangladesh. Her parents and 250,000 other Rohingya fled from Myanmar in 1992s to escape forced labor, persecution, and violence from Buddhist mobs. She completed her secondary and higher secondary exam with excellent Bangladeshi school and college results.

Challenges in the Refugee Camps: Prime Minister of Bangladesh, Sheikh Hasina, said that one million Rohingya refugees are a security threat in this region (Alam, 2018). Following the recent influx in 2017, the Bangladeshi government and the local population showed tremendous sympathy for the Rohingya refugees. Notwithstanding, they are now irritated by the detrimental effects of refugees and the ambiguous repatriation procedure. The following are some of the major difficulties that Rohingya refugees deal with on a daily basis.

Healthcare and Sanitation: The overall health status of the refugees is stable. But some concern is that the significant health problems are related to the substandard living conditions in the camp. A large population in a small space significantly impacts the quality of health. Several women, children and other Rohingya refugees face various kinds of water-borne and infectious diseases. Diarrhea, Measles, Cholera, Hepatitis A, Hepatitis E, Diphtheria, Typhoid and HIV are spread out as the major diseases in Rohingya refugee camps of Bangladesh. All diseases are concerning among refugees, including children and pregnant women. According to the UNHCR report, from August 25 to December 2, 2017, 63,750 Rohingya refugees suffered from diarrhea. They died 15,90329 from fevers, 75,271 from infections, 66,29,145 from skin diseases, 7345 from eye infections, and 7072 from malaria (World Health, 2018). A total of 1950 alerts were generated from January–to September 2018, and 2257 were generated from January–to December 2018. About 827 alerts were generated from December 302018-March 92019,364 alerts were generated from 4 March 2019-May 122019,332, and alerts were generated from 12 May 2019 to 20 July 2019. From the beginning of the influx on 25 August 2017 to August 2018, 3,963,990 consultations have been reported through EWARS. Severe Acute Malnutrition (SAM), measles, diphtheria, Acute Jaundice Syndrome (AJS), confirmed malaria, suspected hemorrhagic fever, meningitis, adult and neonatal tetanus, dengue, and other consultations are also reported as illnesses (World Health, 2018).

The number of hospitals, doctors and other staff is limited. People have to wait more time for emergency treatment. A Rohingya girl said, “I went to the hospital for my emergency treatment, but I had to wait more than 3 hours for my serial. Doctors and other staff were not enough to cover properly”. (In-depth interview by Author, a Rohingya girl from Refugee Camp, Kutupalong expansion side, Cox’s Bazar). Refugees sometimes face racism or misbehaving by health staff or doctors. An 18 years old Rohingya girl said, “One day, I went to the hospital, and a doctor misbehaved with me. I was astonished at why he was doing this attitude. I had never faced this kind of situation before. When I protested his hate speech, he told me to hold my tongue because I am Rohingya, and I have no rights like them. On that day, I was hurt and cried a lot”. (In-depth interview by Author, a Rohingya girl from Refugee Camp, Kutupalong expansion side, Cox’s Bazar. Rohingya refugees expressed their opinion about the satisfaction level of treatment. Among them, 6.6% of refugees are delighted, 61.9% are satisfied, 3.81% are neutral, 21.9% are unsatisfied, and 5.71% are very unsatisfied. Lack of medicine, proper medicine, doctors and staff behavior, level of treatment, and equipment cause dissatisfaction and dissatisfaction. The Rohingya refugees, particularly those who came from wealthy families in the past, are dissatisfied with the treatment they are receiving.

Accommodation: Beginning in September 1991, the government of Bangladesh began constructing makeshift shelters in the Cox's Bazar area. By the time the monsoon season rolls around, they have little chance of surviving. Recent figures obtained after the inflow that occurred in 2017 indicate that the typical size of a family consists of eight to ten people. No matter how many people live in the household, the size of the home will not change. A great number of refugees have found ways to cope by changing their housing units. For example, they have extended a ‘veranda' into the hallway that separates sheds or divided a space that is around 9-10 square meters into two separate rooms. Refugee Respondent said, "We are 12 members of my family. Our house is tiny compared to the family size. So, we divided our house into some rooms. But we have no privacy. Women feel uneasy about living together.

They are not habituating to live current system because one day we had standard houses in Rakhine state where everybody had a wonderful privacy system” (In-depth interview by Author, 46 years old Rohingya man from Refugee Camp, Kutupalong expansion side, Cox’s Bazar, Bangladesh). Refugees were asked about accommodation-related problems. Among the respondents, 32.37% said they face problems with the lack of spaces, and 26.66% said they have no privacy due to overpopulated areas. They need more areas to build their shelter. Most families have about ten members. Around 22.86% said they are facing problems with the weak structure. Sometimes government and private NGOs use immature bamboo and plastic, creating problems. During the rainy season and cyclones, their shelter easily collapses. About 6.6% said about landslide problems. Many people died due to landslides in this region. About 7.61% of people talked about the quality of non-food item kits. Some local partners or unofficial partners used low-quality items. Only 3.8% of people said other problems like fire, interference from local leaders and lack of continuous care about structures.

Gender Violence: Rohingya Refugee women are still now the most vulnerable. Their houses are very congested, and the population density is very high. So, women do not have privacy. Besides, several powerful Rohingyas always try to establish power in the camps. Occasionally the Refugee women are raped by their manipulations. As they are usually called "Illegal Migrants." So they cannot protest. It is also reported that young women and girls are being taken and trafficked into the sex-marked area nearby Cox Bazar and Chittagong. In addition, there were reports of child prostitution inside the camp (Pittaway, 2008). A 28-year-old girl said, *"Till now, I am not married. Early marriage is common in the camps for girls. When I was twelve years, I was kidnapped and raped by a camp leader who was Rohingya. That night, I was going to the toilet with my oil lamp in my hand. Suddenly someone attacked me from the backside, and I had seen him before. He hit me on the head, and I lost my sense. I forget everything after being kidnapped. My family member rescued me later" (In-depth interview by Author, a Rohingya girl from Refugee Camp, Kutupalong expansion side, Cox's Bazar).*

Figure 3: Accommodation-Related Problems in the Camps



Sometimes foreign men and NGOs also engaged in such an event. But how have the buyers taken them from refugee camps after the strict security of the military? Most of the time, the buyers use NGO's private cars and are shown the NGO logo. These kinds of private cars are safe to exit from camps with Rohingya girls. A member of the host community in Teknaf said, *"Rohingya girls left refugee camps with NGOs people for developed treatment. After exiting from the camp, they met buyers and engaged them in prostitution". (In-depth interview by Author, a Bangladeshi host community member, Teknaf, Cox's Bazar, Bangladesh).*

Figure 4: Gender-Based Violence Facing in the Refugee Camps



Refugees were interviewed in the Kutupalong camp on gender-based violence. They were asked, "What violence have you faced in the refugee camp? 14.28% were raped, 23.81% were sexual abuse, 12.38% were trafficked, 6.67% witnessed sexual violence, 2.85% abduction, and 40.01% were humiliated.

Human Rights Situation: In Bangladesh, the Rohingya refugees have been officially segregated and confined to the camps since 1992. Their freedom of movement is limited, and their jobs and other activities outside the camp are officially forbidden. However, in actuality, migrants do participate in labor outside of the camps, and several booths similar to those seen along roadsides have arisen inside the camps. The officials in charge of the camp no longer put up with behavior like this. If the refugees are found outside of the camp, they will be detained by the local police in addition to being punished by the camp police. A Rohingya respondent said, *"I was born inside the camp in 1992. My world is limited here. I have no right to go outside for education or a job. Last year I went Teknaf for work, but police arrested and penalized me". (In-depth interview by Author, a Rohingya boy from Refugee Camp, Kutupalong expansion side, Cox's Bazar, Bangladesh)*. Another 24-year-old Rohingya woman said, *"I do not go outside that much. Once my husband and I went to my aunt's house in Cox's Bazar.*

There, the police arrested my husband and beat him very much. After giving the money to the police, they released my husband".(In-depth interview by Author, a Rohingya woman from Refugee Camp, Kutupalong expansion side, Cox's Bazar, Bangladesh). The restriction on movement impacts the rights of livelihood. Some Rohingya seek informal employment in Teknaf, Ukhia and Cox's Bazar. They have the risk of being arrested or punished. A Rohingya girl stated, *"My husband went to cut wood in the jungle and sold those in the camp. But he stopped going there after extortion by the host community's people. He paid them 40 to 50 Taka (Bangladeshi currency). One day the local people took the money and his mobile phone forcefully when he refused to give him money. He bought the phone by conducting tarawih prayer during Ramadan" (In-depth interview by Author, a Rohingya girl from Refugee Camp, Kutupalong expansion side, Cox's Bazar, Bangladesh).*

Environment: Bangladesh is one of the region's most vulnerable to climate change's effects and deals with various environmental issues. Recent research conducted by the World Bank found that seven of the country's ten districts considered to be climatic hotspots are located in the Chittagong division, which is described as having a high degree of vulnerability to changes in temperature and weather. It is expected that the district of Cox's Bazar would see the most severe unfavorable consequences (Mani, Bandyopadhyay, Chonabayashi, & Markandya, 2018). The most significant environmental problems include- unhygienic housing standards in the villages, water supply pollution, deforestation, and the overexploitation of natural resources. All of which influence the lives of local people. In refugee camps, overcrowding and poor living conditions often lead to the spread of infectious diseases like AIDS, malaria, and diarrhea, amongst many others. Many of these diseases can affect the local population and the refugees, and some can even affect both simultaneously. The presence of Rohingya has led to the decimation of a forest that covers an area of 4,000 acres in Cox's Bazar. In addition, the World Health Organization (WHO) claims that the degradation and depletion of the water supply are linked to the deterioration of the environment, in particular, deforestation and the subsequent soil erosion and decrease of groundwater levels (Ahmed, 2018).

Security: The Rohingya refugee situation is no longer only a humanitarian concern. Instead, it poses potential threats to Bangladesh's internal stability and security, as well as to terrorist groups, confrontations between Rohingya refugees and host communities, and smuggling and trafficking (Myat, 2018). The terrorist organization known as ARSA has shown that it is attempting to recruit Rohingya militants from camps to engage in the cross-border trafficking of weapons and drugs, which poses a threat to both law and order and stability (Haque, 2016). In addition, Al-Qaeda began an internet campaign in which it demanded that the people of Bangladesh assist the Rohingya by engaging in terrorist activity directed at Myanmar (Myat, 2018). A few international NGOs working hard to provide financial support for refugees are also involved in criminal activity on the border between the two nations. An estimated half a million refugees came together on "Genocide Day," which was supported by some non-governmental organizations from other countries, to commemorate the second somber anniversary of their exodus from Myanmar. Before they consent to return, they want assurances about their citizenship rights and other safeguards. At the event, children, women wearing hijabs, and men wearing lungis sarongs chanted "God is Great, Long Live Rohingya" as they marched in the center of the world's largest refugee camp to commemorate what they referred to as "Genocide Day."

This was done to bring awareness to the Rohingya people's situation." After the influx, several clashes and killing incidents were held in Cox's Bazar, Bangladesh. On August 22, 2019, a Bangladeshi local youth political leader of a ruling party named Omar Faruk was killed by a Rohingya leader named Nur Alom. After this murder, police killed 8 Rohingya people, including Rohingya leader Nur Alom for his involvement in the murder of a Bangladeshi man. Nur Alom came to Bangladesh in 1992 and became a Bangladeshi voter. He also collected a 'Smart Card' in an illegal way. On January 23, 2017, the card was issued to his address under Chittagong City Corporation. A local Bangladeshi person said, *"Now, Rohingya is a threat to us, but I never support extrajudicial killing. If the Rohingya people were really convicted, the government should take the initiative under the law and rule of Bangladesh and the United Nations".* (In-depth interview from local Bangladeshi, Teknaf, Cox's Bazar). IOM counter-trafficking consultant Emmy Nurmila Sjarijono's remark can clearly recognize the ferocity of trafficking.

Human trafficking helps to create security concerns for states as a form of collective offense (Mahmood, Wroe, Fuller, & Leaning, 2017). A human trafficking network partnership, mixed with Bangladeshis and Rohingya refugees, presents the possibility of a non-state security risk to Bangladesh. *"Trafficking was already a problem in Cox's Bazar before the most recent influx of refugees from August 2017. With so many more people now at risk, it is important to work together with the police and other authorities to prevent an increase in trafficking victims over the coming month"* (IOM press release, 16 January 2018). She also argued that *"Rohingya children, women and men are targeted by traffickers who seek to exploit them in various situations including the sex industry, as unpaid domestic help, and in other forms of bonded labor. There is no single solution to ending trafficking, and aid ten agencies and the authorities must work together to build skills and share information about this grave issue"* (IOM press release, January 16, 2018).

Discussion

As a result of the fact that Bangladesh was not a member of the Refugee Convention in 1951, the Rohingya are not considered to be refugees but rather "forcibly displaced Myanmar residents." Even though the government of Bangladesh has kept its borders open, refugees continue to be denied formal legal status, are forced to deal with significant mobility restrictions and are unable to find employment lawfully (Hussain, 2022; Karin, 2020). Food scarcity is considerable in the Rohingya camps since most of the families depend on the food provided by the donors. The most pressing concern for the Bangladeshi authorities and other NGOs in Cox's Bazar is feeding the roughly one million Rohingya refugees who have fled to Ukhia and Teknaf. But it will be tremendous for one of the world's most populous countries (N. Uddin, 2018). According to research conducted late last year by the World Food Program and other aid groups, child malnutrition is particularly alarming. At least 24% of kids between the ages of six and 59 months in the Kutupalong area were underweight. The World Food Program (WFP) said that it wants to extend its current e-voucher program, which allows Rohingya refugees to buy 19 different types of food using prepaid debit card entitlements, as a result of the findings (Leidman et al., 2020). In the Rohingya camps, attaining education is a big challenge for the children.

Less than sixty percent of children in the camps are enrolled in any education, and even less than ten percent of those children are able to complete primary school (Prodip, 2017). In 2018, many Rohingya children took it upon themselves to set up makeshift schools within the refugee camps, using books and other educational materials published in Burma. Since the teachers need to earn a living during the day, classes at these schools don't start until 5 p.m. and run until 8 p.m. Long huts with two or three rooms serve as the specific location for these educational institutions. Community members constructed each of these makeshift homes (Hossain, 2021). The scarcity of land around the camp places makes it difficult to manage sludge. The latrines further pollute the tube wells since they have shallow pits and are close to water sources. Many of the bathrooms are unlocked or without doors, and other sites lack security lighting (Banerjee, 2019). The gender-based violence has prevailed in the Rohingya camps, especially among women and girls who face harassment. Women and children in the Rohingya camps endure a variety of forms of violence daily, including abduction, rape, and torture by the "night government," as well as domestic violence such as mental torture, verbal abuse, intimidation, economic marginalization, and sexual abuse by relatives and extended family (Akhter & Kusakabe, 2014; Stoken, 2020). There is a sizable network in South Asia that traffics women and girls, and if the camps on the Bangladesh-Myanmar border stay there permanently.

Traffickers may start to specifically target Rohingya refugees, using the camps as potential trafficking hubs (McCaffrie, 2019). A clear policy that includes their views is required to guarantee that Rohingyas' human rights are effectively respected (Mahmood, Wroe, Fuller, & Leaning, 2017). Refugees informed Amnesty International that they were often forbidden from leaving their temporary accommodations (Amnesty, 2020). Bangladeshi authorities must pay attention to the allegations and worries raised by the Rohingya families and civil society. They must conduct thorough, impartial, prompt, and independent investigations into all alleged extrajudicial executions. They must also ensure that those suspected of being responsible are tried in open courts without being given the death penalty (Amnesty, 2020).

5. Conclusion

As per United Nations, the most persecuted community in the world is Rohingya. Due to oppression and ethnic cleansing, more than one million Rohingyas are now living in the Cox's Bazar district of Bangladesh. Since Bangladesh is not a signatory of the International Refugee Convention, Rohingyas do not enjoy the rights of refugees. However, the Bangladesh government allowed various international NGOs to provide the basic human needs for the Rohingya community living in the camps. A good number of studies focused on specific aspects of life and livelihood at the Rohingya camps. However, the present study is attempted to address significant aspects of the life and livelihood challenges at Rohingya camps in Cox's Bazar. To explore the on-site scenario, the study is based on primary data collected in both quantitative and qualitative approaches. The findings reveal that Rohingyas have been subjected to indiscriminate killings, arrests, and tortures. However, their life in the camps is also full of challenges.

The study's findings reveal that there is a severe scarcity of basic human needs in the Rohingya camps and a prevalence of widespread human rights violations. Among the life and livelihood challenges in the camps are- poor health services, the weak structure of shelter, scarcity of nutritious food, inadequate water and sanitation infrastructure, lack of education facilities after secondary school, gender-based violence, insecurity, congestion and lack of privacy, limited freedom of movement, and high risk of landslide. Compared to the progress of civilization, their life in the camps is far beyond the average living standard globally. The study's findings may guide governments and NGOs operating in Rohingya camps to ensure the Rohingya community's necessities and human rights. Although the study is based on primary data, it is limited to a relatively smaller sample size than the population. Future studies may be conducted using a larger sample size. Moreover, ethnographic studies may reveal other life and livelihood challenges in the camps.

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Social Learning Theory and Gender Representation in Leadership Positions: The Case of the Health Sector in Tanzania

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Abstract: Using the Mbinga council as a case, this study sought to document the influence of the social learning theory on gender representation in leadership positions in the Tanzanian health sector. Interviews, semi-structured questionnaires, and a literature review were used to collect data. The Statistical Package for Social Sciences (SPSS) version 20 was used to analyze quantitative data while content analysis was used to analyze qualitative data. The study revealed that in the Tanzanian health sector, the number of women employees is more than that of men, with most of them holding lower positions, which is directly associated with the socialization of boys and girls during their upbringing. Based on the study findings, the study concludes that, despite Tanzania being a signatory to many gender-related international conventions and having many-gender related laws, policies and programs, the gender gap in leadership positions in the health sector is still wide, caused by, among other things, how males and females were brought up. Therefore, full commitment is needed, starting at the family level, to challenge the patriarchal system in the raising of male and female children. Based on the study findings and conclusion, the study recommends that: (i) the government should raise awareness at the grassroots level of discriminative norms and traditions to discourage them. (ii) multiple actors should collaborate (i.e., the family, schools, organizations, the private sector, non-government organizations (NGOs), faith-based organizations (FBOs), community-based organizations (CBOs), the local communities themselves and the state) to ensure gender equality in raising children, which will improve gender representation in administrative leadership positions.

Keywords: *Leadership position, gender, gender equality, health sector, Social Learning Theory, Tanzania.*

1. Background

The social learning theory postulates that individuals' actions in a given situation are based on their beliefs, and individuals learn by observing others (Bandura, 1971). Social learning theorists believe that personality, behavior and the environment influence us and we can learn by observing others (ibid). Gender inequality, especially in leadership and decision-making roles, has remained a challenge in many public and private organizations (UNDP, 2014), with women holding few top leadership positions worldwide (McLay & Brown, 2000; Coleman, 2002; Onsongo, 2005; Moorosi, 2007; Mwebi & Lazaridou, 2008; Thornton, 2013). Gender equality was introduced by the United Nations Charter of 1948 (United Nations, 1948), to which Tanzania is among the signatories, and the constitution of the United Republic of Tanzania insists on the equality and rights of every person (URT, 1977). Apparently, despite the Tanzanian Government being a signatory to several declarations, such as that of the United Nations Charter of 1948, the Beijing Conference in 1995, the Constitution, and the presence of many legal provisions, policies and programs on gender equality, statistics show that women hold few positions in key decision-making platforms in all sectors.

According to Zewde (2010) and Chartejee (2010), national development and poverty alleviation initiatives demand the utilization of the best talents, capabilities, creativity and dedicated efforts of both men and women. The authors further add that utilization of human resources of both genders will facilitate the successful attainment of sound desired ends. These views together show that for leadership to be effective there needs to be gender awareness and the utilization of both male and female human resources for the development of society and the country as a whole. Tanzania is not excluded from the increasing worldwide challenges of gender representation in leadership, as women acquire fewer leadership positions than their male counterparts (Ely, 2011, OECD, 2011, Kauffman, 2011, Davies, 2011, AAUW, 2011, Murphy, 2012, and European Commission, 2012). There is a gap in empirical academic research on gender representation in leadership in the health sector since most research on gender in Tanzania and worldwide has focused on gender representation in leadership in political positions, private companies and universities (see: Rees 2001, Fiona, 2005, Chatterjee, 2010 and Judeh, 2010). It is against this background, using Mbinga District

Council as a case that this study decided to document the influence of the social learning theory on gender representation in leadership positions in the Tanzanian health sector.

2. Literature Review

Definitions of Key-Terms

Gender: This study adopts the UNDP (2010) definition, whereby gender refers to social differences between men and women, which are learned and transferred to the next generation.

Gender Equality: Gender equality is "a stage of human social development where both men and women realize their full potential" (Darity, 2008). According to UNESCO (2000:5), gender equality means that the different behavior, aspirations and needs of women and men are considered, valued and favored equally. USAID (2012:3) contended that gender equality involves working with men and boys, women and girls to bring about a change in attitudes, behaviors, roles and responsibilities at home, in the workplace and in the community. In this study, gender equality refers to the state whereby both men and women enjoy equal rights, responsibilities, opportunities and treatment in all spheres.

Gender Representation: This study views gender representation as the proportion of males and females holding administrative leadership positions, or how males and females are represented in leadership positions in the Tanzanian health sector.

Gender Representation in Leadership Positions: According to Bagihole and White (2012), early studies of leadership and management did not include gender perspectives until the early 1970s. Early studies concentrated on the dichotomy between the 'leadership trait theory' and 'leadership style theory' that tended to reproduce the popular stereotype that males and females acquire different personality traits and leadership styles (ibid). According to Collison & Hearn (1994), a complex relationship between gender and management exists due to the presence of cultural obstacles facing women, such as gender roles hindering women from gaining and developing managerial roles. Ely (2011) also observed that, for at least a quarter of a century, women have been entering professional and managerial ranks at the same rate as men, yet remain dramatically underrepresented at senior levels globally (Lee 2021; Seo et al., 2017; Appelbaum, et al., 2003; Chatterjee, 2010; Judeh, 2010 and Ely, 2011). Recently, it has been reported that women comprise almost 70% of the health and social workforce, but it is estimated that they hold only 25% of senior positions, (WHO, 2021).

3. Research Methods

The subjective, inductive and descriptive case study strategy combining quantitative and qualitative data collection methods (mixed-methods research) was used in this study. The case study was adopted, because it was useful for gaining an in-depth understanding of a phenomenon, processes or events within their real-life organizational setting (Yin, 2003).

Research Strategy: This study adopted subjective interpretive epistemology, which discards the possibility of creating generic laws, as opposed to the positivistic approach (Bain, 1989). Therefore, the findings from this research can only be generalized to other healthcare organizations in a similar context.

Study Population: The targeted population of the study was 1,269 out of 3,436 Mbinga District employees. The unit of analysis for this study was employees on the government service salary scale of grade 'E' and above.

Sample Size: The sample size of this study was 67 respondents, which was thought to be enough and representative. A sample size of 67 respondents gets support from CED (2015), which suggested that 30 people is the minimum acceptable size for representative data. A summary of the study population and sample size is presented in Table 1 below.

Table 1: Sample Size

Government Salary Scale	Population	Sample size
TGS/TGTS/TGHS "E"	715	27
TGS/TGTS/TGHS "F"	486	16
TGS/TGTS/TGHS "G"	42	11
TGS/TGTS/TGHS "H"	6	7
LSSE 1	20	6
Total	**1269**	**67**

Source: (Developed by Researcher based on Mbinga District Council's data on its Employees (2015).

Sampling Methods and Techniques: Stratified simple random and purposive sampling techniques were adopted to select the respondents. In the stratified sampling technique, 1,262 members of the targeted population were divided into two strata (male and female) and a simple random sample was drawn from each stratum to ensure gender representation. Using this method, sixty (60) respondents were obtained. The purposive sampling technique was used to select seven (7) respondents from Mbinga District Hospital to obtain more information on the health sector in the district. Six (6) key informants were interviewed to obtain further data.

Data Collection Instruments: To ensure the validity of the results, both qualitative and quantitative data collection methods were used, whereby self-administered questionnaires, key informant interviews, and documentary reviews were employed.

Data Analysis: The IBM Statistical Package for Social Sciences (SPSS) program version 20 was used to analyze the quantitative data, while the qualitative data was analyzed using the content analysis technique, which involved careful transcription, categorization, coding and filtering to come to a conclusion based on the findings.

Validity and Reliability: Validity was achieved by using both qualitative and quantitative data collection methods. The instruments were pre-tested on a different council before data were actually collected to ensure that the instruments would provide accurate data. Moreover, all the scales used in the questionnaire were checked for internal consistency (reliability) through Cronbach's alpha coefficient. Cronbach's alpha 'tests if scales measure the same underlying constructs' whereby an alpha of 0.7 or above indicates that a scale is considered reliable (Pallant, 2001:85). In this study, the calculated questionnaire had a reliability statistic (Cronbach's alpha) of 0.77, indicating its internal consistency.

Ethical Considerations: This study followed all the procedures for carrying out the research, including obtaining formal permission from the relevant authorities and the informed consent of the respondents, whose anonymity was ensured by not revealing their names and identity. Honesty and openness were maintained by the researcher while explaining the objectives.

4. Results and Discussion

General Characteristics of the Respondents: The results (Table 2) show that having a gender balance was considered when obtaining the sample and therefore it comprised 51% of male and 49% of female respondents. The results show that most respondents 57% were aged between 35 and 44, 37.3% of the respondents were aged between 45-54, 7.5% of respondents were aged between 20-34, and only 4.5% were aged 55 and over. This implies that the respondents of the study had been exposed enough to gender-related inequality in the work environment and the society they came from. Almost half 47.8% of the respondents had a Bachelor Degree, 29.6% had a Diploma, 10.4% had a Master's Degree, 5.9% had a Postgraduate Diploma and the remaining 4.5% of the respondents had a certificate. This implies that the respondents had better levels of education and so they could significantly contribute their views on gender issues. Most of the respondents 83.5% were married, 7.5% were single, 4.5% were separated/divorced, and the remaining 4.5% of the respondents were widows.

Table 2: General Characteristics of the Respondents

Characteristics	Frequency(n=67)	Percent (%)
Sex		
Male	34	50.7
Female	30	49.3
Total	**67**	**100**
Education Level		
Certificate	3	4.5
Diploma	18	26.9
Advanced Diploma	3	4.5
Bachelor Degree	32	47.8
Postgraduate Diploma	4	5.9
Master's Degree	7	10.4
Total	**67**	100
Age of Respondent		
20-34 years	5	7.5
35-44 years	34	50.7
45-54 years	25	37.3
55 and over	3	4.5
Total	**67**	100
Marital Status		
Single	5	7.5
Married	56	83.5
Divorced/Separated	3	4.5
Widowed	3	4.5
Total	**67**	100

Source: Research Data 2015.

Gender Representation in the Health Sector: The findings reveal that the majority of health workers in Tanzania were women. This was confirmed by the interview with a key informant, who explained that: *"the majority of health workers in Tanzania are women, although they are concentrated in lower positions, especially nursing, while men predominate professional posts like medical doctors, clinical officers and dental experts, to mention a few"* ***(Ministry Representative-4)***. Empirical evidence from Mbinga District Council also shows that the majority of health workers were women, whereby in 2019 there were 302 employees, of whom only 79 (26.2%) were men and 223 (73.8%) were women. However, the majority of women were medical attendants, enrolled nurses and assistant nursing officers, as indicated in Table 3 below.

Table 3: Gender Distribution by Health Occupation/Cadre in Mbinga District Council

S/N	Profession	Male	%	Female	%	Total
1	Medical Specialists/Consultants	0	0	0	0	**0**
2	Medical Doctors	1	100	0	0	**1**
3	Assistant Medical Officers	5	71.4	2	28.6	**7**
4	Clinical Officers	11	57.9	8	42.1	**19**
5	Assistant Clinical Officers	2	50	2	50	**4**
6	Nursing officers	0	0	1	100	**1**
7	Assistant Nursing Officers	19	45.2	23	54.8	**42**
8	Enrolled Nurses	8	11.8	60	88.2	**68**
9	Technologists	7	53.8	6	46.2	**13**
10	Assistant Technologists	8	36.4	14	63.6	**22**

11	Health Secretaries	0	0	1	100	**1**
12	Environmental Health officers	3	75	1	25	**4**
13	MCHA	0	0	2	100	**2**
14	Medical Attendants	16	13.6	102	86.4	**118**
TOTAL		**79**	**26.2**	**223**	**73.8**	**302**

Source: Research Data 2015.

One could argue that such a gender disparity in leadership positions is probable in rural districts such as Mbinga, but statistics from Ilala Municipal Council in 2015 revealed that among the 175 health sector employees who were new (employed in 2015), 126 (72%) were women and only 49 (28%) were men, with most professional posts being occupied by men. For example, among the eight (8) medical doctors employed only three (3) were women. The findings concur with URT (2013) findings that the majority of health workers in Tanzania were women, who were confined to nursing positions, while men dominated all the professional positions. The report further stipulated that in 2013 there were 64,449 health workers, of whom 42,861 were women (66.5%) and 21,588 (33.5%) were men. Most of these female employees were clinical officers, as indicated in Table 4 below.

Table 4: Gender Distribution by Position

S/N	Position	Male	%	Female	%	Total
1	Medical Specialists/Consultants	261	75.4	85	24.6	**346**
2	Medical Doctors	835	73.6	300	26.4	**1135**
3	Assistant Medical Officers	1215	69.8	526	30.2	**1741**
4	Chemists	33	100	0	0	**33**
5	Assistant chemists	6	100	0	0	**6**
6	Pharmacists	233	68.7	106	31.3	**339**
7	Clinical Officers	3840	64.5	2110	35.5	**5950**
8	Assistant Clinical Officers	752	68.6	344	31.4	**1096**
9	Physiotherapists	78	66.1	40	33.9	**118**
10	Dental Therapists	64	65.8	123	34.2	**187**
11	Assistant Dental Officers	121	71.6	48	28.4	**169**
12	Health Laboratory Scientist3	56	68.3	26	31.7	**82**
13	Technologists	3881	84.7	699	15.3	**4580**
14	Assistant Technologists	698	50.9	674	49.1	**1372**
15	Health Secretaries	184	58	133	42	**317**
16	Environmental Health officers	566	60.9	363	39.1	**929**
17	Assistant Environmental Health officers	771	69	347	31	**1118**
18	Other Professionals	1862	48.1	2010	51.9	**3874**
19	Health Laboratory Assistants	75	48.1	81	51.9	**156**
20	Health Recorders	41	35.3	75	64.7	**116**
21	Assistant Nursing Officers	747	17.6	3501	82.4	4248
22	Nursing officers	422	17.2	2,034	82.8	2456
23	Nurses and midwives	1569	11.1	12,527	88.9	14096
24	Medical Attendants	3,829	19.5	15,837	80.5	19666
25	Support Staff	831	28.2	2117	71.8	2946
TOTAL		**21,588**	**33.50%**	**42,861**	**66.5**	**64,449**

Source: Developed from URT (2013) Human Resources for Health: Country Profile 2012/2013.pp 16-18.

The Influence of the Social Learning Theory on Gender Representation in the Tanzanian Health Sector: The results (Table 5) show that almost 81% of the respondents agreed with the view that socialization in Tanzania is less likely to influence females to do well in higher education and pursue leadership positions, and so it has an influence on the existing gender gap in leadership positions in the health sector and public service as a whole. These results are in line with those of Hora (2014) and Kariuki (2006), who indicated that Africa is largely a male-controlled society, causing male-dominated socio-cultural attitudes to prevail, resulting in the belief that leadership is a man's field, which therefore leads to the presence of more male leaders and fewer role models for young women and girls. Similarly, Han, *et al.* (2012) added that family background influences the choice of educating boys and girls and their achievements since parents and caregivers are regarded as role models for the children and therefore whatever happens in the family is taken as normal behavior by the children. Attane (2012) and Ogunsanya (2007) pointed out that discrimination and the social positioning of women during their childhood have resulted in their limited experience of leadership.

Table 5: The Influence of Socialization on the Existing Gender Gap in Leadership Positions

Views	Responses in Percentage				
	1	2	3	4	5
Socialization in Tanzania is less likely to influence female individuals to do well in higher education and pursue leadership positions	1.5	4.5	8.9	59.7	20.9
Some parents in Tanzania prefer to educate boys rather than girls	1.5	4.5	11.9	67.2	14.9
The gender gap in leadership positions stems from the belief about gender roles, which encourages households to spend less on girls' schooling or women's training	0	3	11.9	43.3	41.8

Question: Please indicate your views regarding the listed perceptions of socialization in Tanzania. **Key**: 1 for strongly disagree, 2 for disagree, 3 for Neutral, 4 for Agree and 5 for Strongly Agree.

More Emphasis on Men in Education and Leadership Positions: The results (Table 5) show that most of the respondents 82.% were of the view that some parents in Tanzania prefer to educate boys rather than girls, 12% of the respondents neither agreed nor disagreed with the statement and the remaining 6% disagreed. The results obtained from semi-structured interviews also show that the practice of educating children by gender is apparently declining in urban areas as opposed to rural areas. The interviewees indicated that there are some individuals and societies which emphasize enrolling boys and girls in primary school as it is compulsory by law. It was also found that men attained a higher level of education than women, whereby 53% of the respondents with an advanced diploma and above were men. This implies that fewer girls than boys go on to higher levels of education. The situation is worse in mathematics and science as only a few women manage to study these subjects. Below are some of the findings from the semi-structured interviews.

"Women with higher education in certain fields are few, for example in the health department most medical doctors are men and even in some sections like X-ray here in Mbinga we only have men. Women are not coming forward for these kinds of jobs, as some are afraid of doing them, believing they are very tough, some fear the responsibility, while others don't want to be blamed by service recipients or top management" **ID-5: (Informal Discussant).** *"It is historically believed that women are weak, resulting in some parents discouraging them from studying some subjects, including science. That's why in some sections there are very few women."* **H-9: (Head of department/Unit)**. This research further found that although families enroll both boys and girls, more emphasis is put on boys achieving better academic performance than girls. Below are some of the findings. *"Although there has been much improvement, societies still put more emphasis on male children than female children. I have a neighbor who has two sons and two daughters, but you can see that the husband is having higher dreams for their sons than their daughters. Most of the time you can hear him saying "I want my sons to be very good and famous doctors, but if my girl's become nurses that is enough". Imagine these words coming from an educated man having an educated wife who can at least fight for her girls, but what will happen when only the father is educated or the couple is uneducated?"* ***H-6:*** **(Head of department/Unit).** *"Some parents still*

think that educating a girl child is investing for other families (future husband's family). Some other society members are shocked when they see women leaders.

To them, being in a leadership position is a male responsibility and it is shameful for men to be headed by women. People like this can never invest in their female children or even support them when they show an interest in holding leadership positions". **LN-1: (Local NGO representative).** Unequal treatment during upbringing was also reported by Zacharia (2014), who found out that there was unequal access to education by boys and girls in Korogwe District caused by various factors, including early pregnancies and bad socio-cultural practices, such as early and forced marriages. Baidya et al., (2000) assert that the most harmful method of discrimination against girls was the denial of the right and opportunities to education. With a similar view, ILO (2001); Njogu and Orchardson-Mazrui (2005); UN (2010); & Mensah, et al. (2014) reported that the gender gap is rooted in social norms and traditions, as well as the belief that the role of women is to look after the household and boys have greater prospects for formal employment, which has contributed to the denial of girls' right to education. According to ADF (2008), most girls in poor rural areas of Tanzania and Uganda were prepared for motherhood rather than for further studies, an attitude that has been influenced by poverty and socio-cultural norms. According to the UN (2010), the number of girls enrolled, especially in secondary schools, has increased at a much slower rate and is widening in some areas, especially in Sub-Sahara Africa, South and West Asia and the Arab States, despite several efforts being made to narrow the gender gap in education.

Based on the United Republic of Tanzania, Education and Training Policy (2014:58), many girls in Tanzania have been left behind at various levels of education. For example, in 2012/13, girls outperformed boys at the primary school level, where girls comprised 50.4% and boys 49.6%. As they went higher, boys outperformed girls at the lower secondary level, where boys comprised 53% and girls 47%. At the higher secondary level, boys comprised 68% and girls 32%. At the level of vocational education and training, 54.5% of males performed better than 45.5% of females. As regards technical education, 54.5% of males outperformed 45.5% of females, whereas in higher learning institutions/universities males comprised 65% and females 35%. This shows that the 1:1 ratio is only seen at the primary school level which, as pointed out earlier, could have been because enrolment at the primary school level was compulsory by law, whereas the number of girls decreases at an increasing rate as the level of education rises. According to the United Republic of Tanzania, (2014) the ratio of males and females entering higher education stood at 1:2. Although the number of students admitted to higher education increased from 37,667 (25,061 males and 12,606 females) in 2005 to 162,250 (105,381 males and 57,129 females) in 2013, the gender gap is still very high. For instance, a comparison of the number of admissions in 2005 with that of 2013 shows that there was only a slight increase in the percentage of females admitted from 33.5% in 2005 to 35% in 2013, meaning that the number of females admitted increased by only 1.5% in eight (8) years (URT, 2014).

The Belief about Gender Roles: The results (Table 5) also indicate that 85.1% of the respondents strongly agreed and agreed that the gender gap in leadership positions stems from the belief about gender roles, which encourages households to spend less on girls' schooling or women's training. Evidence collected from the semi-structured interviews shows that the existence of the patriarchal system in Tanzania not only affects education and leadership issues but also the whole process of upbringing due to its emphasis on the unequal treatment of boys and girls. It was further noted that, although the situation is improving, non-elites and rigid individuals regard boys and girls as different creatures with different roles, and so girls are limited in some important constituents while growing up, and in the long run when they grow up, they tend to perceive that being leaders is men's role. Below are some of the findings. *Many families do not bring up their children equally although it differs among elites and non-elites. Some elites are now treating their children equally while non-elites and rigid individuals still regard their children as unequal creatures with different roles"* **MR-2: (Ministry Representative).** *"Unequal treatment when bringing up our children is obvious in Tanzania.*

In many households, you will find girls are busy with household activities while boys are relaxing and studying. When our children observe this, it affects their perception and even their future career" **NN-2: (National NGO representative).** *"The truth is even when you try to bring up your children equally or favor female children, people, especially in rural areas, will look at you with negativity"* **LN-2: (Local NGO representative).** Hora (2014) and Kariuki (2006) indicated that Africa is largely a male-controlled society, and so the prevalence of

the male-dominated socio-cultural attitude that leadership is a man's field results in the presence of many male leaders and only a few role models for young women and girls. Similarly, Han, et al. (2012) added that family backgrounds influence the choice of educating boys and girls and their achievements since parents and caregivers are regarded as role models for the children, and so whatever happens in the family is regarded as normal behavior by children. Atane (2012) and Ogunsanya (2007) pointed out that discrimination and social positioning of women during their childhood have resulted in their limited experience of becoming leaders.

5. Conclusion and Recommendations

Based on the findings, it is concluded that the way individuals are brought up in Tanzania has something to do with the existing gender gap in leadership positions in the health sector and other sectors in Tanzania, which is attributed to the unequal treatment of boys and girls while they are being brought up, the preference for educating boys rather than girls and the belief about gender roles. Based on this conclusion, the government's current efforts to improve gender representation in leadership positions need to go beyond the formulation of many policies and legal provisions, initiating gender-related programs and being a signatory to international treaties.

Recommendations and Policy Implications

Recommendations: Based on the study findings and conclusion, the study recommends that: (i) the government should raise awareness at the grassroots level of discriminative norms and traditions to discourage them. (ii) Multiple actors (i.e., the family, schools, organizations, the private sector, NGOs, FBOs, CBOs, the local communities themselves and the state) should collaborate to ensure gender equality and improve gender representation in administrative leadership positions.

Policy Implications: The study pinpointed two areas for policy and practice. The first is including men in the whole process of achieving gender equality. It is only when men are involved and act without bias that positive results in terms of gender equality can be realized. Second, since it was revealed that education is a significant attribute for holding administrative leadership positions, female children should be encouraged and supported to study hard at higher education levels and ignore the perception that there are fields specifically for men and women to have qualified members from both sexes in all fields.

Author's Contribution: The findings of this study supplement the existing literature and provide a further understanding of gender representation, specifically in leadership positions in the health sector in Tanzania where women employees are the majority. The study findings support the social learning theory, whereby the majority of the respondents (81%) indicated that socialization in Tanzania is less likely to influence female individuals to do well in higher education and pursue leadership positions. The recommendations made in the study can be used for future analysis and research in related studies.

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Food Insecurity in Thailand during the Coronavirus Pandemic

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Abstract: Food insecurity is a reality for millions of people around the world and affects even relatively affluent populations such as those found in urban Bangkok in Thailand. It is anticipated that the ongoing coronavirus pandemic will have intensified the presence of food insecurity both in the initial closedown that prevented food from entering the city but, also, in the longer term as the economic damage has intensified across the country. This raises questions about the extent to which people are experiencing food insecurity and how are they dealing with it. In particular, what level of resilience are people showing in response to the crisis? A qualitative research program of personal interviews was organized to explore these issues. Content analysis revealed that the sample was responding to these issues in a manner generally predicted by the existing research but with the addition of a non-technical form of mindful meditation we have called 'everyday fatalism.' The paper contributes to awareness of food insecurity in Thailand during the coronavirus period and an understanding of the adaptability of people in a Buddhist society dealing with hardship. The spiritual element of life is present in becoming resilient according to how respondents describe their experiences.

Keywords: *Coronavirus, everyday fatalism, food insecurity, mobility, Thailand.*

1. Introduction

Previous research (Walsh & Maneepong, 2012, Walsh, 2016)) indicated that food insecurity at various levels could be found within Thailand in both urban and rural locations. In urban locations, food insecurity associated with poverty could be found in pockets across the city, as well as more generally in some slum areas. Low-income people tended to see themselves as part of a household in which all members would contribute on a pragmatic, day-by-day basis depending on what opportunities may be available (Rimmer & Dick, 2009). In Bangkok, in common with most of the country, people found it a little easier to survive because of the availability of fresh food cooked to order on the city's many street markets and from mobile street vendors (Maneepong & Walsh, 2013; Walsh & Maneepong, 2012). However, complex supply chains link food items grown in the countryside and consumed in the cities and the onset of the coronavirus pandemic had put those artifacts under unprecedented pressure. This requires people to demonstrate resilience in stressful situations. Overall, the Thai GDP contracted by 6% in 2020 and large numbers of workers lost their jobs, particularly in the tourism and related service sectors (IMF, 2021). Up to 60% of households of low-income families experienced problems with food insecurity and had to resort to resilience strategies to cope with the situation (World Bank, 2021). Are the means of coping consistently among households of different countries?

Some research has suggested that Thai society produces people with a distinctive response to the need for resilience but most of the studies related to elderly (i.e., 60+) people in rural areas which may have been undergoing change but had not yet reached the state of being diversified, contemporary agriculture and agro-industrial sites that many parts of rural Thailand have now become. Has the nature of Thai resilience, if there is such a thing, been the same now as it was in the past and does resilience have the same meaning in urban Bangkok as it does in other parts of the country? To investigate these issues, a program of qualitative research based on personal interviewing was conducted to understand the extent to which food insecurity had changed as a result of the pandemic and how people were able to cope with it, assuming that they were indeed coping with it. This paper describes the research and the lessons learned from it. It contributes to an understanding of household strategies when dealing with environmental shocks from a comparative perspective. The paper is organized in a standard fashion. The next section concerns the literature review and highlights the knowledge gap that is being addressed by the research. This is followed by a discussion of the method employed to gather and analyze data, a description of the findings obtained and a discussion of the

meaning of those findings in the context of the gap in knowledge identified in the literature review. A conclusion and list of references employed complete the paper.

2. Literature Review

Resilience: The most commonly used concept to describe responses to difficult conditions is resilience, which is "… the complexities of individual and group responses to traumatic and challenging situations (Aburn, Gott & Hoare, 2016). Resilience is used by individuals and households as well as larger systems such as cities and societies as a whole. Partly to avoid the temptation to incorporate some form of imagined moral worth into the measure of resilience, researchers have tended to focus on a list of observables, objective measures, such as access to water and needed resources, access to credit and markets and so forth (Alinovi, Mane & Romano, 2008). This approach has become extremely important in development studies, where it has been used to distinguish between households and regions in countries facing poverty (d'Errico, Romano &Pietrelli, 2018) or reasonably predictable natural disasters such as flooding in areas prone to that problem (Nguyen & James, 2013). Attempts have also been made along the same lines to enable households and communities to measure their potential level of resilience in advance of unexpected disasters (Arbon et al., 2016). LaLone (2012) argued that, in such cases, more attention should be given to the role of response and recovery contributions provided through informal networks on local levels.

While Joseph et al. (2020) observed the benefits in such circumstances that could arise from empowering local people in knowledge about possible first responses and bottom-up preparation for any eventuality. After the 2011 floods, when more than 700 people in Thailand were killed, some resilience was shown among some sectors of society which, while being effective, was of an ad hoc nature rather than being a coherent institutional response (Ghaderi, Som & Henderson, 2015). 0Tendall et al. (2015) link food security with resilience by pointing out how complex the systems involved are, with many diverse actors and chains of interactions that may have unexpected and unpredictable results. This complexity was revealed by the coronavirus pandemic and resulted in, among other effects, the absence of various types of food from shops and restaurants accustomed to stocking them. Indeed, the severity of the situation provoked problems around the world to an entirely 0unpredicted extent (McKinnon et al., 2021). The FAO (2020) noted that many low-income Thai people are likely to be negatively affected by food insecurity as a result of the coronavirus.

Resilience in Thai Society: The social system of Thai society means that elderly people are treated with respect and often included in multi-generational households that help to arm them with greater degrees of personal resilience (Soonthornchaiya, 2020). This has enabled elderly Thai people to be able to 'move on' with their lives, progressing from one situation to the next without having to acknowledge a setback (0Pathike, O'Brien & Hunter, 2019). Previous work in this area had also indicated that Thai elderly people tended to possess a constellation of ways of thinking that provided them with 0a mental stability in the face of environmental shocks (Maneerat, Isaramalai & Boonyasopun, 2011). Drawing on the practice of Buddhism, Falk (2012) writes about the aftermath of the 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami and finds that religious explanations of events and the daily enactment of religious processes are generative of resilience in the Thai context.

However, there is always the danger of essentialism in studies of this sort and a comparative study between Thai and Swedish elderly people found almost no differences on a resilience scale (Choowattanapakorn et al., 2010). Resilience can be improved by the presence of stronger linkages in terms of financial and transportation infrastructures to connect people within and across borders. Figures indicate that remittances to Thailand reached record levels at the end of 2021, standing at nearly 19,000 billion THB in November (approximately US$525 billion) (Trading Economics, 2022). This suggests that physical support for interpersonal networks and its role in promoting resilience has been enabled. However, Porst & Sakdapolrak (2018), meanwhile, note that in the case of Thailand, the role of migration between urban and rural settings in difficult times and its role in promoting resilience is complex and can only be properly understood when bearing in mind several socio-spatial scales simultaneously. These factors rather suggest that resilience that might have been distinctive in different societies would tend to converge over time. This would be, therefore, one symptom of globalization.

The Thai Government's Response to the Coronavirus Pandemic: Thailand was badly affected, particularly because of the closure of the country and its impact on the tourism industry and the extensive nature of the informal sector, although it has benefited from the continuation of the manufacturing industry (IMF, 2021). The Thai government adopted a robust and successful set of public health measures to combat the spread of the coronavirus in the country. Strict border controls were introduced together with a stay-at-home policy and the requirement to use masks outside of the house. Thai people have generally been receptive to social distancing and masking policies, as well as accepting vaccinations when they were made available. Many Thai motorbike riders notoriously refuse to wear helmets (Meneghella & Walsh, 2018) but are content to wear masks, while their use has been common on public transport for people not wishing to spread infection from flu or colds for some years. Major outbreaks of the disease are associated with specific events and locations, often tied to foreign migrant workers or other means of transmission from overseas (Rajatanavin et al., 2021).

Subsequent public health management issues adopted a differentiated approach depending on the province, with Bangkok one of the regions designated as part of the most severe 'deep red' area. However, despite the success of the strategy in limiting domestic transmission for some months, the price in terms of economic damage was severe. Millions of workers were unable to work and had few sources of government support (Baker & Phongpaichit, 2021). Thailand's economy relies to a considerable extent on tourism and, in its absence, the entire country suffered. People's reserves were drained and people became increasingly concerned about what was to come. Some evidence suggested Thais were the most pessimistic in ASEAN in this regard (Webfact, 2021). Consequently, in October 2021, an official announcement was made that entry quarantine requirements would be phased out and that Thai people would have to learn to live with the virus. In the meantime, the government introduced a number of stimulus measures aimed at reducing the stress on affected workers and distressed businesses (see Table 1 below).

Table 1: Employment-Related Measures Taken by the Thai Government to Combat COVID-19

Liquidity for Labor in Affected Industries
Cash support of 5,000 THB for 3 months starting April to June for labor and temporary workers and freelance not registered under the Social Security System (SSS). Individuals under SSS will receive 50% of their previous salary (but not exceeding the maximum salary of 15,000 THB per month if the employer temporarily halts employment
Cash support of 5,000 THB for 3 months starting May to July for farmers
Special loans of 10,000 THB per person, 0.1% interest, no collateral needed
Special loans of 50,000 THB per person, 0.35% interest, collateral needed
Loans to government pawn shops to further boost liquidity for lower-income citizens
Grace period provided for principal payments and consideration for a reduction in interest per customer for personal loans, hire purchase and leasing loans, house loans, SME loans, microfinance and nanofinance
Measure to Enhance Skills for Workers
Seminar to enhance career skills or to arrange social activities
Social Security Contributions
Liquidity Boosting for Entrepreneurs
SME Loan Restructuring
Adjustment in Roles of Financial Institutions and Banks
Measures to Adjust/Lower Fee Structures

Source: Adapted from KPMG (2020).

Affected people were requested to apply to the relevant government office to request assistance. As 2021 continued, new schemes to permit cost-sharing between the individual and the government in purchasing relatively low-cost local goods and services were made available as apps with online applications possible.

3. Methodology

This project used a qualitative approach featuring in-depth personal interviews, conducted as circumstances permit either in person or by telephone. Respondents were selected by a combination of purposive and

snowball sampling techniques which were intended to reduce the risk of an overly homogenous sample. A semi-structured research agenda was constructed before interviews began based on the gap in knowledge identified in the literature review and related subjects. The agenda was updated during the interviewing process to reflect new knowledge learned, new subjects becoming relevant and some existing issues dropped because of not being relevant. Each conversation was open-ended and allowed to vary to reflect the different issues of importance to the individual respondents. A total of 25 interviews were conducted for this project. Each interview was accompanied by extensive note-taking and then transcription of the notes at the earliest opportunity.

The transcripts were entered into a database together with relevant secondary literature and the notes kept by the researchers during the research period. The contents of the database were then interrogated through content analysis procedures with a mixture of approaches, with in some cases tags obtained from the data and in other cases tags imported from anticipated results. This approach was taken because some knowledge is already available concerning living conditions during the pandemic and other areas were expected to be unique because of a specific location and cultural factors. Findings were divided into main themes and sub-themes and these are presented in the following section. The interviewing took place in June and July 2021, when the lockdown was taking place but vaccinations were beginning to become available for some of the population and before the decision to attempt to re-open the country was taken.

4. Findings

After the content analysis process was completed, the main findings appeared to be grouped into four different areas: food insecurity; mobility crisis; the specter of debt and everyday fatalism. These will be dealt with individually.

Food Insecurity: Thailand's internal infrastructure has been developed to a degree that meant that supply chains within the country were quickly restored after the initial lockdown and fresh food was returned to city centers quite quickly thereafter. This has given people an additional resource in coping with possible food insecurity in that they could buy inexpensive ingredients and cook their food. Most Thai dishes, in addition to steamed or glutinous rice, are quickly cooked in a wok with relatively few ingredients and most households can support themselves this way. There is also a custom of sharing food with family members or friends in their own or other households and this too helps in providing variety. At the time of the research, respondents were still willing to restrict expenditure and simply do without more expensive options for the time being. Further research would be needed to determine whether people will continue this approach indefinitely and, also, whether people with specific nutritional needs are able to cope in the same way.

Those households that were able to cope better with the economic downturn were those who had members in a variety of different occupations, mixing together both the formal and informal sectors. Members of the formal sector were most likely able to receive most if not all of their regular wages and could share these with other household members. Those in the informal sector were able to try different activities on an entrepreneurial basis when required and, if this were not possible or sufficient, then they could follow a strategy of resilience that combined reduced expenditure with the sale of existing assets. In terms of food insecurity, therefore, a significant proportion of the sample had been suffering from this at the milder end of the scale, i.e., they were not able to buy as much of the food that they like to eat as they would if they could. However, this research found only a few cases of food insecurity at a more serious level. This had not yet become an endemic issue in the sample obtained.

Mobility Crisis: Residents of Bangkok who are labor migrants generally have had the opportunity to return to provincial homes where restrictions are often less severely enforced and opportunities exist to share resources with other family and household members. However, permanent residents of Bangkok may have invested resources in their homes and businesses which would be very difficult to abandon even for a limited period of time. One respondent and her family members had a property near Bobae market and a business that kept them so busy that they apparently did not have enough time to eat breakfast. Unfortunately, that business had been declining for some years as customers began to switch to direct buying from Chinese vendors and the closing of the market was a hammer blow to the footfall of what was left. Much of the value of

the property was bound up in its proximity to a bustling market and so they could not afford to sell it at a loss. In common with other vendors, they resorted to an online presence and a delivery service. However, this business model required new skills and competencies they did not possess and, to be competitive.

It was necessary to sign up with a larger delivery company with an online presence that could be trusted by customers and this squeezed their margins further. This typical story indicates a reversal of normal mobility practices. Mobility provides a form of capital and, for mobility justice to occur; it should be spread with an eye to equality (sheller). However, the pandemic has made mobility a danger to all those who practice it and it is now necessary to consider immobility capital – that is, privilege now rests with those who can afford to stay in a (relatively) safe home and order all required goods to be delivered to them by delivery workers who must bear the risk of navigating infected streets and warehouses. Many respondents had suffered from this reversal and it seems likely that the situation will continue, at least to some extent, even after the end of the pandemic, if that day ever comes. Some respondents did identify one positive aspect of this situation if they were able to remain at home in a residence in a decent condition. This is that they could practice social distancing in their homes in a way that they would not have been able to do in the normal circumstances of working away from home. This benefit merged into others: there was less stress arising from dealing with others in the workplace and the opportunity to turn to quietism at home, which appealed to a number of respondents.

The Specter of Debt: In common with many agricultural societies, Thai society developed an unwanted reliance on debt that was unavoidable based on climatic and geographical conditions. The central problem is that farmers earn income only when their crops are harvested (historically, other activities were mainly aimed at household consumption) but the farming family needs money throughout the year for health, education and other expenses. As inputs such as insecticides and chemical fertilizers became popular and widely available, many farmers felt it necessary to buy them on credit and repay the debt at harvest sale time. However, there was the perennial risk of disaster from drought, flood or disease. Farmers in the central region, where two or three harvests per year were possible survived better than their counterparts in northeastern Isan, for example, where the fertility of the land was much lower because of soil quality and reliance on the monsoon. Even today, when subsistence agriculture is much less prevalent than it once was, Thai people have still internalized the fear of debt and potential ruin. Indeed, a new threat now stalks them as the spread of the credit card economy promises a superior lifestyle on the never. As a result, a number of respondents in this sample spoke about their fear of having to take on debt if they were to survive the current ordeal.

One retired military officer reported that he had managed to pay off the debt that had kept him awake at night prior to the pandemic. He, like other respondents, reflected that he could live on very little and would be content to do so as required as long as the debt was not incurred. However, there was concern about institutional failure which could allow the specter to come in through the back door – one respondent, in particular, was worried about a rumor (unconfirmed) that insurance companies would cancel all policies for people who had contracted COVID-19. There was not much trust exhibited in such institutions and, indeed, in the governments to be able to resolve such problems. There was only limited interest in government schemes for support for individuals (most schemes were aimed at the formal sector, where communications are more convenient); although a number of respondents were aware of and had used the Khon La Krueng 50-50 co-payment scheme. It seems this scheme was popular as people were able to use it on household consumption decisions that they would have made anyway. However, some respondents reported that their relatives outside Bangkok had not used the scheme because they did not have money to deposit initially with the app and there was some suspicion of particular vendors. Even so, it was deemed successful in Bangkok at least.

Everyday Fatalism: Buddhist philosophy teaches that all things are impermanent and subject to change and, hence, fatalism in the sense that one's destiny is fixed is not a possibility. However, this is a philosophy that operates over the long term and, for human consciousness, hemmed in by limitations of the sense and the ability of the mind to concentrate, a rational satisfying answer to physical difficulties is simply to accept that such things befall people from time to time and, so, the most reasonable response is to wait for things to improve. Certainly, a number of respondents in this research offered the answer that, since there was nothing, they could do about the situation; they would just put up with it and wait until the bad times ended.

Some respondents appeared to be quite cheerful about this and thought that it represented an opportunity for them to reflect on the blessings they had received and the good things in their lives, while others tended towards a more somber acceptance of the facts. Respondents in this category tended to think that they behaved in the correct way that was indicated in their moral education.

Interestingly, there was not much correlation between everyday fatalism and attitudes toward vaccination. Many people were still waiting for their chance to be vaccinated and only a small number felt they were being made to wait too long or, more specifically, that it was unfair that they had not received the vaccinations while some foreigners had already received theirs. There were also a small number of respondents who were planning not to receive the vaccination, based on rumors they had heard through the internet about possible negative side effects. It is interesting to compare this response with the attitude towards temporal authority. Thai people have become accustomed to practicing self-censorship when dealing with the state, although there have been moments of hope in the C21st that a genuine government of the people would provide the liberty of freedom of expression and of thought. However, the time of research did not coincide with one of those periods and most respondents were reticent about what they said. Even so, it was apparent that there was a certain willingness to dismiss the efforts of 'the government' as a whole rather more than is normally found.

Discussion

In line with the existing research, it is found here that the Bangkok sample was experiencing minor forms of food insecurity as a result of the coronavirus and its impact on economic activity. People whose work was in the informal sector were much more affected than people in the formal sector and had little recourse to government assistance, other than an everyday consumption cost-sharing system. The most common means of dealing with the stress of loss of income and uncertainty over the future was through reducing expenditure and the sale of owned assets. This is consistent with earlier work (e.g., Luthar & Cicchetti, 2000). Education and health expenditures may be postponed rather than cancelled altogether but the cancellation might come after further exposure to stress – at the time of writing, the emergence of the Omicron variant of the virus was resulting in further restrictions on the movement of people, despite the government's previous announcement that Thailand would in the future learn to live with the virus. Respondents in complex households also demonstrated the sharing of resources and pooling of income from daily changing opportunities that have been predicted by, for example, Rimmer & Dick (2009). Exchanging home-cooked food also provided some variety and additional resilience for informal networks operating from the bottom-up, also supporting the research that suggested that community-based empowerment and systems were likely to be at least as important as top-down implementations, at least in the case of this sample. Where there were variations from mainstream resilience literature is in the issue of the everyday fatalism that seems to stem from Buddhist practice and philosophy.

Respondents had become familiar in their lives with the experience that unfortunate or unpleasant things will happen and that seeking to challenge them only leads to worse circumstances, which is a lesson that is drawn in popular media and social media about political dissidence. As a result, the best approach is to accept and wait. One relevant tool in this approach is through mindful meditation, which is taught in Thai Buddhism and which is credited with a role in keeping calm and rational the twelve Thai boys who were trapped in a flooded underground cave for two weeks (Barclay, 2018). Scientific research into the value of mindful meditation is difficult to assess. However, one meta-analysis concluded that it can "… reduce multiple negative dimensions of psychological stress (Goyal et al., 2014)." It is presumably the case that the lack of numerous interruptions to daily life and the repetition of daily and seasonal routines makes this ability to meditate and hence demonstrate resilience more prevalent among the rural elderly (or else it is an artifact of essentialist thought). That most people do not consciously practice mindful meditation in the prescribed way but are aware of it as part of their sentimental education means that they draw upon it in daily life in the form of everyday fatalism. This is sufficient to help deflect the worst impacts of stress and so is likely to be repeated as required. Claiming that this is how Thai urban citizens customarily behave at times of stress is claimed to be a contribution to knowledge, although it is a claim that will need further testing.

5. Conclusion

This paper has reported on qualitative research conducted with a sample of people in Bangkok during the ongoing coronavirus pandemic. Qualitative research is very useful in eliciting people's opinions during unprecedented situations such as is currently being faced but is vulnerable to the charge that it can obtain an overly homogeneous sample, especially when convenience and snowball techniques of sample respondent-seeking are employed. Attempts have been made here to avoid this danger by purposively seeking heterogeneous respondents according to demographic characteristics. However, the reader must judge whether sufficient precautions have been taken in this case. Qualitative research is also vulnerable to the charge that analysis and interpretation of data is more subjective than objective in nature and lacking in replicability and generalizability. While these charges have a fundamental substance, it is possible to reduce the risk by careful application of content analysis techniques and the attempt to triangulate observations with independent occurrences.

Again, the reader will be the judge of the success with which this has been achieved here. As the coronavirus continues to menace humanity for another year, there is an ongoing need to investigate its impact on the daily lives of people from all walks of society. Studies are beginning to emerge around the world but it is evident that these mostly relate to specific stages in the development of the pandemic (e.g. the early onslaught, the first lockdown, the new wave and so on) and people in different countries are responding to its continued presence with more or less displays of petulance or patience. At the moment, Thai society is leaning more towards the latter than the former and, although it is far from clear how sustainable this situation may be, it is perhaps inevitable that we reach for the Theravadin Buddhism that so many Thai people profess for explanations. In this paper, the term 'everyday fatalism' has been used to describe how people behave in practice.

Although Buddhist thought rejects the concept of fatalism in its sense of being unable to affect one's teleological existence, it is agreed that in daily life Thai Buddhists will accept an unpleasant or trying situation as being an unavoidable fact of life that will eventually go away of its own accord. It seems likely, although there is a need for additional research to explore this possibility, that everyday fatalism increases in line with the inability of people to effect change in their surroundings or demonstrate agency. In terms of recommendations, it is evident that the government programs that have been put forward have been used and, for many people, are of great value. These should be extended as needed. Clearly, neoliberalism fails people in difficult situations. Many people are able to contribute to helping themselves in promoting resiliency when they have information to do so and this too should be provided – indeed, many Thai government programs have been quite well publicized during this period, especially in urban areas. The urban-rural divide that this reveal should also be considered.

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