Author

  • Anton Miglo

    • School of Business, University of Bridgeport, Bridgeport

Abstract

According to Graham and Harvey (2001), an immense gap exists between capital structure theories and practice. By analyzing students’ perception of capital structure theories and the differences between their opinion and that of the current CEO’s and managers this paper argues that this can be partially explained by current educational practices. Educators mostly focus on one or maybe two most popular theories and students have much smaller knowledge about other theories. Secondly educational practices favor trade-off theory to asymmetric information based theories. The paper provides some suggestions regarding capital structure education and future research.

Keywords

References

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How to Cite

Miglo, A. (2012). Managers versus Students: New Approach in Improving Capital Structure Education. Journal of Education and Vocational Research, 3(11), 353-369. https://doi.org/10.22610/jevr.v3i11.89

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Section

Research Paper

Published in

Vol. 3 No. 11 (2012) Learning Outcomes, Industry & Global Mobility View issue contents

Published

2012-11-15

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