Author

  • Chidiebere C. Ogbonna

    • Department of Development Studies, Kampala International University, Uganda
    • Uganda

Abstract

The article examines the plausibility of using sanctions as an instrument that can deter nuclear proliferation. Sanctions have been a favored policy tool in the arsenal of the international community, when it comes to issues relating to deterring nuclear proliferation. The adoptions of sanctions as a policy instrument that can quench the nuclear ambition of states and/or regimes are based on two main assumptions. First, it is believed that they add cost to the regime aspiring to acquire nuclear weapons, by limiting the regime’s access to finance and thus discourage it from furthering its nuclear ambition. Second, it is believed that the impact of sanctions on the welfare and well-being of the citizens of a targeted regime will prompt the citizens to rebel against the regime and perhaps force it to comply with the demands of the sanctions imposing party. This article however, took a dissimilar view and argues that sanctions as a single policy tool cannot check nuclear proliferation. At best they can be used to express discontent or signal displeasure to a regime with nuclear ambition. The article concludes that diplomacy devoid of rapacity is and will remain the plausible mechanism to deter nuclear proliferation.

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How to Cite

Ogbonna, C. C. (2017). Nuclear Proliferation Deterrence: Bullying vs Diplomacy. Journal of Social and Development Sciences, 8(2), 47-55. https://doi.org/10.22610/jsds.v8i2.1801

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Section

Research Paper

Published

2017-08-18

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