Author

  • Latifa Ghalayini

    • Lebanese University, Faculty of Economic Sciences and Business Administration, Lebanon
    • Lebanon

  • Dana Deeb

    • Lebanese University, Doctoral School of Law, Political, Admin and Economic Sciences, Lebanon
    • Lebanon

Abstract

This paper develops an adjustment to utility measurement in integrative negotiation where the negotiation information context is incomplete. The developed function reveals not only win-win outcomes but also deceptive practices where negotiators accept a win-lose deal and then compensate their loss in a deceptive way and greedy practices where negotiators realize their strong competitive position and try to extremely maximize their gains. However, to realize the objective, the utility measurement function literature and theories are reviewed to determine the relevant function structure and the necessary attributes that reveal the desired outcome in an incomplete information context. After examination, relationship measurement is added to the function under two utilities: Decision Utility and Experienced Utility. The foundation of the utility measurement function contributes to revealing satisfying win-win outcomes in an incomplete information negotiation context. Therefore, it develops the negotiation field by designing win-win deals that are beneficial and satisfying in which the advantage is distributed between the negotiators.

Keywords

References

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How to Cite

Ghalayini, L., & Deeb, D. (2021). Utility Measurement in Integrative Negotiation. Information Management and Business Review, 13(1(I), 1-15. https://doi.org/10.22610/imbr.v13i1(I).3153

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Research Paper

Published in

Vol. 13 No. 1(I) (2021) Strategic Agility, Negotiation & Leadership View issue contents

Published

2021-07-10

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